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Abstract 
 
The effects of government subsidies to corporate R&D on firms’ innovation 
outputs still remain inconclusive in existing studies. Moreover, little is known how the 
screening system of the public R&D programs influences the effect of such programs. 
This study examines the effects of Innofund (one of the largest Chinese government 
programs supporting corporate R&D activities) on firms’ innovation outputs in China.  
In particular, the project screening mechanism was changed due to policy 
amendments in 2005. This exogenous policy shock allows us to estimate how the 
project screening system affects the influence of public R&D subsidies. Based on a 
panel dataset of Chinese manufacturing firms, we find Innofund-backed firms 
outperform their non-Innofund-backed counterparts in innovation, measured by the 
number of patents, new product sales, and the volume of exports after they gained 
funding. The magnification effects of Innofund are larger after 2005, when the 
project-screening scheme became more decentralized indicating that decentralized 
screening functions better in public R&D investment. Finally, the effects of Innofund 
and the effects of the decentralized screening system that occurred in 2005 vary 
substantially across markets. The more economically and institutionally developed the 
market is, the stronger the Innofund effects and the project selection decentralization 
effects appear. The identification problems are handled by using the propensity score 
matching approach and the instrumental variable approach.   
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 1. Introduction  
Government funding for R&D activities is a major phenomenon in most 
countries. Theoretical arguments on the pros and cons of public financing in corporate 
R&D are abundant. Empirical estimations on the effects of government-subsidized 
R&D based on firm-level data remains modest and inconclusive. Griliches and Regev 
(1998) and Branstetter and Sakakibara (1998) find that government-subsidized firms 
achieve higher productivity and profitability in Israel and Japan, respectively. Lerner 
(2000) reports that US firms subsidized by SBIR (Small Business Innovation 
Research program) grow faster in terms of employment and sales compared with 
firms that are not backed by SBIR. A collection of studies suggest that government-
subsidized firms invest more in R&D activities compared with firms that are not 
backed by the governments in the US (Audretsch et al., 2002), Israel (Lach, 2002), 
Ireland (Görg and Strobl, 2007), and Germany (Aerts and Schmidt, 2008; Czarnitzki 
and Lopes-Bento, 2011). Griliches and Regev (1998) and Irwin and Klenow (1996) 
also suggested that government-subsidized firms generate higher social returns than 
their counterparts.  
However, some studies find negative or no relationship between government 
subsidies, corporate R&D activities, and firm performance. For instance, Klette and 
Møen (1999) find that government subsidies have no positive effects on firm 
performance in Norway. Using similar data, Clausen (2009) finds that “research” 
subsidies stimulate R&D spending within firms whereas “development” subsidies 
substitute such spending in Norway, which suggests that private R&D expenditure is 
best stimulated in areas where the gap between the social and the private rate of return 
 to R&D is high. Furthermore, examining the public R&D financing in Finland, Lööf, 
and Hesmati (2005) find that public R&D financing has positive effects only on the 
private research expenditures of small firms. Wallsten (2000) used a unique dataset 
that covers SBIR-funded firms and SBIR-rejected firms and firms that never applied 
for SBIR backing, and find that SBIR subsidies crowd out private R&D inputs. By 
contrast, David et al. (2000) suggest that this crowding effect varies across industries. 
Acemoglu et al. (2013) finds that government R&D subsidies to incumbent firms 
reduce social welfare and growth because of the crowding out effects.   
The mixed results of the examinations on government backed private R&D 
activities alert us to some major questions. First, the different results from cross-
country studies suggest that the effectiveness of public support to private R&D 
activities may vary under different institutional contexts. Second, the above-
mentioned studies emphasize government involvement as a response to market failure, 
but they are based on an assumption that the government is well organized, 
uncorrupted, and relatively benevolent. However, distortions of government 
interference in the market have been extensively discussed (Stigler, 1971; Laffont and 
Tirole, 1993). In particular, China poses serious challenges to the literature that 
although its legal and financial institutions are underdeveloped or flawed, it is one of 
the fastest growing economies in the world in the past one third of a century (Allen et 
al., 2005; Xu, 2011, Allen et al., 2012). Moreover, driven by the government policy 
and government finance, China’s R&D expenditure became the second largest in the 
world since 2010 (WSJ, 2010) and may become the largest in the world around 2022 
 (KPMG, 2013), its R&D over GDP ratio is now higher than the EU (Noorden, 2014), 
and its total patent applications has surpassed the U.S. since 2011 (KPMG, 2013).1 A 
natural question is whether government interference can also solve market failures in 
an economy, such as that of China, where “government failures” are more severe, and 
market system is in the transition period and yet functional well.  
Furthermore, most of existing literature focuses on the consequences of 
government R&D programs without examining the project screening system of the 
programs. The quality of the investment may depend on how the projects are selected. 
Sah and Stiglitz (1991) discuss the tradeoffs of the project selection under centralized 
and decentralized decision-making contexts. They suggest that centralized 
organizations might delay decision-making and reduce the total number of projects 
because of cost constraints and lack of local information compared with decentralized 
screening system. Associated with this line of research, which is mainly derived from 
the information approach, Aghion and Tirole (1997) and Hart and Moore (2005) 
further emphasize that a decentralized decision-making system may strengthen the 
incentive of local agents for acquiring information and may reduce the overload 
problem experienced by the principal. At the same time, decentralized decision-
making for matters that are more relevant to local agents may facilitate the 
participation of the agent in contractual relationships. However, decentralized 
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 decision-making may be at the cost of losing control. Another line of research mainly 
based on the soft-budget constraints approach argues that investment in projects of 
high uncertainty by a centralized system may be inefficient due to the lack of 
commitment to withdraw the investment. This bureaucratic screening system may 
mistakenly filter out or delay promising but risky projects that can potentially 
generate high social returns (Dewartripont and Maskin, 1995; Qian and Xu, 1998). 
The above-mentioned studies suggest that the efficiency and quality of investment 
decisions depend on how project selection is organized. However, to our knowledge, 
no research on public R&D subsidy programs addresses the effects of project 
screening system on the consequences of the programs. 
The present study fills these gaps. We examine the effects of Innovation Fund 
for Small and Medium Technology-based Firms (Innofund), the largest government 
program that supports the R&D activities of privately owned small- and medium-
sized firms in China. China is of our special interest for four major reasons. First, 
China is the world’s largest economy where the government has long been deeply 
involved in businesses, particularly in resource allocation (Allen, et al., 2005; Li et al., 
2008; Guo et al., 2013a; Guo et al., 2013b). At the same time, the Chinese 
government has been emphasizing the role of innovation in fostering a sustainable 
economy, and allocates public funds at accelerating rates to support R&D activities. 
These public financing initiatives set up a context for us to examine whether 
government R&D programs under the “visible hand model” is effective. Second, the 
Innofund program, which was initiated by the central government in 1999, 
 experienced a substantial change in its project screening system in 2005, when the 
central government decided to shift from a centralized project screening system into a 
relatively more decentralized screening system. This exogenous policy change allows 
us to examine the effects of different ex-ante project selection systems on the effects 
of Innofund program, with a quasi-experiment approach. Third, China is large and the 
regions vary in terms of institutional and economic development (Xu, 2011). 
Examining the heterogeneity of the effect of the Innofund across regions within the 
same country (i.e., China) allows us to identify the effects of institutional and 
economic development resulting from government R&D programs by controlling 
identification concerns for which many cross-country studies are criticized (Allen et 
al., 2012). Finally, innovation and progress in science and technology are top 
government agendas in China. Public support in China for industrial innovation is 
also a major topic in international political economy because it determines the 
sustainability of China’s growth and affects the competitive landscape of the global 
economy. However, solid empirical analysis on the consequences of public support is 
yet to be conducted. This assessment of Innofund will have important policy 
implications.  
Three major questions are addressed in this paper. First, we ask whether 
Innofund-backed firms generate more innovation outputs compared with firms that 
are not backed by Innofund, and whether the outperformance is increased after the 
funds are infused. Second, we ask whether the change in project screening systems in 
2005 affects the effect of Innofund on the innovation outputs of the firms. Third, we 
 explore cross-market variations in the effects of Innofund on innovation outputs of the 
firms. Doing so allows us to identify how institutions and economic development 
interact with screening system changes after 2005.   
We compare the innovation outputs of the Innofund-backed firms and their 
counterparts from 1998 to 2007, based on a panel dataset of Chinese manufacturing 
firms. Our sample includes almost all Innofund-backed manufacturing firms with 
annual sales over RMB 5 million across the nation within the period of time. The 
sample consists of over 18,000 firm-year observations for Innofund-backed firms and 
over 64,000 firm-year observations of non-Innofund-backed firms. We find that 
Innofund-backed firms generally outperform their non-Innofund-backed counterparts 
in terms of innovation, which is measured by new product sales, exports, and number 
of patents. At the same time, the increases in innovation outputs are significantly 
magnified after the firms gained Innofund. More importantly, the magnified effects of 
Innofund on corporate innovation were further increased after 2005 when the central 
government changed the project screening from a centralized system into a more 
decentralized one. The results confirm that decentralized screening is more effective 
than centralized screening in public R&D investment. Finally, we find that the effects 
of Innofund differ across markets. The effects of Innofund on the innovation outputs 
of firms are further increased in regions that are more economically developed and 
regions with a more developed private sector and legal institutions. Moreover, these 
magnification effects are further enlarged after 2005 when the Innofund screening 
system became more decentralized.  
 We use two approaches to deal with identification issues. First, we use the 
propensity score matching (PSM) methodology to match Innofund-backed firms with 
non-Innofund-backed firms by different dimensions in the year before the Innofund 
was awarded to reduce potential selection issues. To further address the potential 
concerns with omitted variables, we use an instrumental variable to identify whether 
the Innofund magnification effects are driven by unobservable variables. The 
instrumental variable we used is the total number of the firms in high-tech zones of 
the city, where the Innofund firm is located in each given year. The total number of 
the high-tech firms in local high-tech zones signals the overall development of 
corporate R&D capability and the supply of strong high-tech firms. This measure is a 
good instrumental variable for our estimations because of the higher probability of the 
local firms to be selected by Innofund when more high-tech firms are in a locality. 
The results of the two-staged regressions confirm that the magnification effects 
presented in Innofund-backed firms are driven by Innofund support. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the 
institutional background of Innofund program and the policy changes in 2005. Section 
3 describes the sample and data. Section 4 presents the findings on whether Innofund 
affects innovation outputs of the firms and examines the robustness of the results. 
Section 5 reports the findings on the effects of the screening system change of 
Innofund. Section 6 provides empirical findings on the across-region heterogeneity of 
the Innofund effects. Section 7 concludes this study.   
2. Institutional background of Innofund program 
 2.1 Introduction of Innofund Program 
Innofund is a special government R&D program, which was established upon 
the approval of the State Council in May 1999. Innofund was included in the Law of 
the People’s Republic of China on Scientific and Technological Progress in 2007. As a 
first policy guide fund, Innofund aims to “facilitate and encourage the innovation 
activities of small and medium technology-based enterprises (SMTEs) and the 
transformation of research achievements by ways of financing, trying to bring along 
and attract outside financing for R&D investment of SMTEs. At the same time, as a 
nonprofit-making government policy, ‘it is oriented towards social welfare induced by 
positive effect of innovation.”2 
The principal criteria for Innofund applications are: First, the projects should 
comply with national industrial technology policies, bear relatively high potential for 
economic and social benefits, and should possess strong market competition capacity. 
Second, the applicant should be a business corporation with generally not more than 
500 employees among which no less than 30% should have higher education Third, 
the annual R&D investment of the firm should be at least more than 3% of the total 
sales, and the number of direct R&D employees should be more than 10% of the total 
number of employees. Forth, firms with leading products in the market with economy 
of scale production must show good economic performance. The following projects 
will be prioritized: projects with innovative technology or independent intellectual 
property and high value-added; projects that are founded by research personnel or 
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 overseas returnees to transfer their scientific achievements; innovation projects jointly 
initiated by firms, universities, and research institutions; and projects that use new and 
high technology to revive the stock assets of traditional industries and drive job 
creation. 
Innofund mainly provides three forms of financing, namely, appropriation, 
bank loan interest subsidies, and equity investment according to the introduction of 
the program. Appropriation is mainly the start-up capital provided to small firms 
founded by research personnel with their own scientific achievements. Partial 
subsidies are also provided to SMTFs for new product development and pilot 
production. The appropriation amount to each project will not exceed 1 million RMB, 
with a maximum of two million for key projects. Firms are required to provide dollar-
to-dollar matching investments. Loan interest subsidies are mainly provided to 
SMTFs that require loans from commercial banks to expand the production scale of 
innovation projects. The total amount of subsidy of an individual project is generally 
within 1 million RMB and 2 million RMB for key projects. Equity investment is 
generally reserved for projects with high levels of technology, high innovation 
capacity, and market potential in emerging industries. On average, Innofund 
investments will not exceed 20% of the registered capital of the investee company. 
Innofund has provided over 19.17 billion RMB to 30,537 projects from 1999 
to 2011. Among these projects, 27,498 were backed through appropriation, 2880 were 
supported through loan interest subsidies, and 1,159 were sponsored by other forms, 
including bank loan insurance, equity investment, and other subsidies. In general, 
 over 86% of Innofund-backed projects are backed with appropriation. The size of 
direct investments by Innofund seems modest compared with the total government 
R&D expenditure. Innofund induced 1:11 external finance from local governments, 
banks, and venture capitalists. Moreover, Innofund has incubated some world-class 
famous hi-tech firms, such as Zhongxingwei and Huawei. According to official 
reports, Innofund helped firms create about 450,000 jobs, 209.2 billion RMB in sales, 
22.5 billion RMB in tax income, and 3.4 billion RMB in exports. By the end of 2008, 
82 out of 273 publicly listed companies on China's Small and Medium Enterprises 
Stock Exchange were once supported by innofund3. 
2.2   Innofund administration before and after 2005   
Two major government agency levels are involved in the administration of 
Innofund. At the central level, the Innofund Administration Center (IAC) under the 
Ministry of Science and Technology (S&T) is in charge of Innofund operations 
including issuing application guide, proposing preferred fields and industries for each 
year, screening and evaluating projects, and, conducting midterm supervision on 
individual projects and closing contract with firms. The Ministry of Finance plays a 
regulatory role and is involved in approving the yearly budget of Innofund and the 
application guidelines proposed by the Ministry of S&T for transferring funds to the 
IAC twice a year, and monitoring and the evaluation of Innofund. The Ministry of 
S&T and the Ministry of Finance should report to the State Council on the operation 
and performance of Innofund each year. A consulting committee composed of 
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 technology and management specialists, economists, and entrepreneurs help identify 
preferred supporting areas and provide advice on Innofund guidelines. The IAC is 
required to adhere to the principles of honest application, fair processing, strict 
selection, and transparent administration. According to the reports published by IAC,   
the fraud cases that occurred each year were less than 0.5% of total projects in the 
past ten years.  
At the local level, each province has an Innofund office under the Provincial 
Science and Technology Committee, which reports to the IAC. The role of the local 
Innofund office was changed significantly in 2005, when the Innofund administration 
was reformed. The main policy changes focused on reducing application processes 
and the decentralization of screening and evaluation. In particular, local Innofund 
offices were delegated with more power in selecting projects. Before 2005, project 
screening was more hierarchical and centralized. Local Innofund offices mainly act as 
bridges between the IAC and local firms without much say on project selection. The 
local Innofund offices had three major responsibilities before 2005. First, they were 
responsible for delivering and promoting guidelines or policies from the IAC to local 
firms or agencies that helped firms prepare application documents required by the 
IAC. Second, they collected the application materials and transferred them to the IAC. 
Third, they were in charge of certifying the qualification of Innofund candidates. A 
panel of experts at the IAC then evaluated the recommended projects and the IAC 
made the final funding decisions. That is, local Innofund offices could only decide on 
the projects they recommend, but they had no say on the final decisions. Meanwhile, 
 local governments did not have to commit any resources to the recommended projects 
until the final decisions were made by the IAC. After the final funding decisions were 
made, the provincial Bureau of Finances was normally required to match 50% of the 
total support from the central governments to the projects selected by the IAC.  
In 2005, the Innofund program introduced a new application and screening 
system. This system largely increased the transparency of project screening and 
decentralized decision-making during project selection. The roles of the local 
Innofund offices shifted afterwards. First, the local governments (provincial level) 
were required to set up their own Innofund programs and took responsibility for initial 
project selection starting from 2005. The project assessments conducted by the local 
Innofund offices comprised 30% of the final decision made by the IAC. Unlike in 
previous practice, where local governments only needed to provide matching funds to 
projects granted by the IAC, the 2005 reform required local Innofund offices to 
commit at least 50% of the proposed support (25% for provinces in western China) to 
the locally selected projects before they recommend such projects to IAC. Moreover, 
local Innofund offices were required to publicize the list of the projects they plan to 
recommend to IAC on their websites for two weeks before they finally submit their 
recommendations. The local Innofund offices must react if any public criticisms are 
made on the proposed projects.  
The policy change in 2005 fundamentally changed the ex-ante project 
screening of the Innofund program. First, it decentralized decision-making in ex-ante 
project evaluation by giving local-knowledge holders more say in final decisions. 
 Second, it introduced a co-investment mechanism that aligns the interests of the local 
and central governments. Third, it created a monitoring system that allows the public 
to observe the decisions made by local governments through a system that makes 
mandates transparent. This systematic change reduces potential agency problems and 
incents local governments to exert more effort in project selection. Similarly, it 
reduces inefficiencies because of the hierarchical decision-making process. Hence, we 
expect this policy change to significantly change the effects of the Innofund program.  
3. Data and Sample  
 Our data come from three major sources. First, basic information on Innofund-
backed firms is from the website of Innofund program ( http://www.innofund.gov.cn). 
The names of Innofund-awarded firms are publicly announced on the website each 
year since 1999. The website provides the name and address of the firm, the project 
by nature, the date the firm won Innofund, the type of support from Innofund, and the 
performance evaluation results of the project (i.e., terminated during the process or 
finished on time with the proposed goal achieved). Second, firm-level data on 
financial information and other firm-specific characteristics are from the Chinese 
Manufacturing Firm Survey Database (CMFSD). CMFSD is virtually composed of all 
manufacturing firms in China, with annual sales of at least 5 million RMB 
(US$ 750,000) between 1998 and 2007. This database provides sophisticated financial 
information and other firm-specific information, including location, industry, age, 
ownership structure, and others. Last, patent data are from National Patent Database, 
which covers complete information for all patents filed in China.  
We first identify the Innofund-backed firms in CMFSD to gain financial and 
other information for the firms. We observe a total of over 6,167 projects backed by 
Innofund between 1999 and 2007 (some firms were backed by Innofund more than 
once) from the Innofund website. We use accurate matching to match Innofund-
backed firms to the CMFSD by names, addresses, and SICs. Subsequently, we use 
fuzzy matching to avoid missing those firms whose names or addresses are not 
consistent with the census database (e.g., when abbreviations are used either in the 
Innofund website or the census database). Moreover, an Innofund-backed firm will be 
 excluded if it lacks information in the year when it received funding. Given that the 
database only covers manufacturing firms with annual sales of at least 5 million RMB, 
we lose non-manufacturing Innofund-backed firms and Innofund-backed firms with 
sales less than 5 million RMB for the estimations. This data screening and matching 
strategy enables us to cover almost a full sample of Innofund-backed manufacturing 
firms that are included in the Chinese Manufacturing Enterprise Survey. After 
preliminary matching, 2,638 firms that won at least one Innofund between 1999 and 
2007 are obtained for estimations. The sample consists of a total of 18,224 firm-year 
observations for Innofund-backed firms in total.  
We then construct a control group to compare Innofund-backed and non-
Innofund-backed firms in terms of innovation outputs. We build the control group in 
several steps to ensure that our results are not driven by a specific matching method. 
We first identify the non-Innofund-backed firms (i.e., firms that were eligible to 
applying for Innofund but did not apply or did not win it each year) from the Chinese 
Manufacturing Firm Survey Database. The Innofund selection criteria are announced 
officially each year. A firm is eligible for Innofund application if it has a SIC code4 
that is similar to the SICs of the awarded group, if it has less than 500 employees, if it 
has more than 30% employees working on R&D and if it has a leverage ratio lower 
than 70%. After identifying the non-Innofund-backed firms, we randomly draw one-
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 to-five matched pairs to build the control group of non-Innofund-backed firms (i.e. 
non-Innofund) while controlling for location (provincial level). This approach enables 
us to make detailed comparisons in different dimensions. Finally, 64,474 year-firm 
observations are obtained for 12,025 eligible firms. However, these firms are not 
supported by the Innofund program. 
We are interested in the change in the innovation of firms after they receive 
support from Innofund. Innovation outputs are measured in three ways, namely, new 
product sales, total exports, and the newly granted patents of the firm in a given year. 
Data on new product sales and exports are available in the Chinese Manufacturing 
Firm Survey Database. We calculate the absolute number and the relative ratio of new 
products sales and exports to the total outputs of the firm in a given year.  
Data on patents are obtained from the National Patent Database, which covers 
information on all patents granted in China, including the type of patent, the name of 
the inventor, the owner of the patent, the filing and granting time, the category of the 
patent by industry, and others. We match the patent information for all observations in 
our sample by year. Three types of patents exist in China, namely, invention patents, 
utility model patents, and design patents. Invention patents are subjected to searches 
and examinations similar to those conducted in other major patent offices in the world. 
Invention patents are given 20 years of protection and may be granted to methods and 
products. Utility patents are given 10 years of protection and are generally granted to 
technical solutions that relate to shapes or structures. Design patents are also given 10 
years of protection and are normally granted to shapes and patterns with aesthetic 
 appeal that may be patentable. All the three types of patents are protected by the 
Patent Law of China. Firms have to exert efforts to generate patents while invention 
patents are obviously the most technologically innovative and require more R&D 
effort than the other two types. This study measures patent outputs by two values: the 
number of invention patents and the total number of patents of all types granted to a 
firm in a given year. Given that working out and applying patents take time, we use 
the filing time of the newly granted patents for the panel estimations. In addition, we 
also try use one-year lag of the filing time for all estimations to check robustness of 
the results.  
To capture the effects of cross-market heterogeneity, we focus on two aspects 
of regional characteristics, namely, economic development and institutional 
advancement. For economic development, we divide provinces into developed 
regions and non-developed regions according to the economic classification given by 
the National Bureau of Statistics of China. The developed regions include Beijing, 
Shanghai, Shandong, Jiangsu, Zhejiang and Guangdong, and the rest belong to non-
developed regions.  
For institutional advancement, we borrow an index system defined by Fan et 
al. (2009) that measures the degree of marketization in every province based on 
surveys and statistical data every year since 1997. We focus on two major aspects that 
may affect Innofund effects: the total share of the private sector and institutions for 
business activities, including law firms, accounting firms, and other business agents 
per 1,000 persons in a province in a given year.  The details are discussed in Section V.  
 We also control some firm-specific variables that include the age, size, 
leverage ratio, and ownership structure of the firms. Firm characteristic information is 
from the Chinese Manufacturing Firm Survey Database (1998 to 2007). Firm_Age is 
the age of the firm in a given year. At the firm-specific level, to minimize statistical 
error, we adjust Firm_Age in a panel data fashion. The average firm age of Innofund-
backed firms is around 10, which is similar to that of non-Innofund-backed firms in 
our randomly drawn sample. Firm_Size is measured by the natural logarithm of the 
annual sales of the firm. Leverage is the ratio of total liability over the total assets of 
the firm in a given year. Finally, we control the ownership structure of the firm. 
State_Shr is the ratio of state ownership over the total equity of a firm in a given year. 
The variables used are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles to eliminate outliers. 
Table 1 presents the distribution of the sampled Innofund-backed firms. Panel 
A shows the industry distribution of the Innofund-backed firms. Innofund support is 
mainly concentrated on the eight industries that basically belong to high-tech 
industries as defined by the National Bureau of Statistics. In total, 81% of the sampled 
Innofund-backed firms are in high-tech industries. The allocation of Innofund is 
consistent with the goal of government R&D programs of supporting corporate R&D 
activities. Panel B presents the year distribution of the Innofund-backed firms by the 
time when they received their first round of Innofund. We show the distribution of the 
awarding year for the sampled Innofund-backed firms in this study and the full 
sample of Innofund-backed projects. The panel shows that, during the year of 1999 to 
2007, the sampled Innofund-backed firms have a similar year distribution compared 
 with those in the full sample suggesting the representativeness of our sample in this 
aspect.  
Table 2 reports the summary statistics of Innofund-backed firms and firms in 
the control group, including the number of observations, mean value, minimum and 
maximum, and standard deviation. Panel A shows the comparison of total firm-year 
observations. Panel B shows the same information for Innofund-backed firms when 
the firms gained their funds and their matched counterparts. The panel shows that, on 
average, Innofund-backed firms have better innovation outputs in terms of the number 
of patents, new product sales, and exports. Similarly, these firms are larger in size 
measured by total sales and total assets. Moreover, these firms have lower liability 
compared with non-Innofund-backed firms. The ages of the firms do not exhibit 
considerable difference. 
4. Does Innofund stimulate Innovation?  
In our subsequent analysis, we examine whether the Innofund program can 
stimulate innovation outputs. First, we compare the innovation outputs of Innofund-
backed firms with non-Innofund-backed firms. Second, we look at whether the 
amount of Innofund is associated with innovation outputs. Finally, we address 
selection bias issues and identification issues using the PSM approach and 2SLS 
regression models.  
4.1 Innovation outputs of Innofund-backed and non-Innofund-backed firms  
 To test whether the Innofund program helps firms generate more innovation 
outputs, we implement the fixed effect panel data regression approach through the 
following basic regression models:  
 
 
where i indexes firms,  indexes time, and yit are dependent variables used to measure 
the innovation outputs of firm  including new product sales, exports, and patents at 
time . InnoAftit is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the firm has gained Innofund 
support at time t, and equals zero otherwise. A vector of control variables is indicated 
by ,  is used to control time-invariant firm-specific unobserved variables, and  
is used to control yearly fixed effects. The effect of Innofund on innovation activities 
is represented by . The above equations are estimated on the Innofund firm sample 
and the randomly matched non-Innofund firm sample. We use fixed effect panel data 
model to estimate (1.1) when the dependent variables are export and new product 
sales. We use fixed effect negative binomial model to estimate (1.2) when the 
dependent variables are the number of patents. We adjust the standard errors for 
correlation within the cluster in all models (Petersen, 2009). 
Table 3 presents the results on how Innofund affects the innovation outputs 
firms. Models (1) and (2) show that  is significantly and positively 
associated with the new product sales of firms, regardless of whether it is measured 
by absolute number or relative ratio. This finding suggests that Innofund-backed firms 
 generate significantly higher new product sales after they gained government support 
compared with non-Innofund-backed firms and the same firms before funds were 
infused. For example, Model (2) shows that, Innofund-backed firms generated a new 
product sales ratio that is 3.1% higher than that of non-Innofund-backed firms after 
winning Innofund and the same firms before the funds were infused. It is 18.56% of 
the average new product sales ratio of Innofund-backed firms when funds were 
awarded. To check the robustness, we use an alternative measure for new product 
sales. We found qualitatively similar results when we used the log-link formulation of 
new product sales. Models (1) and (2) show that Innofund not only motivates firms to 
generate more new product sales, but it also changes the composition of the total sales 
of the firms. Models (3) and (4) report the estimations on the exports of the firm. 
Similarly, we find that Innofund could also help firms generate more exports in terms 
of total amount and relative ratio. For example, Model (4) shows that after winning 
Innofund, Innofund-backed firms have 1.1% higher export ratio than non-Innofund-
backed firms and the same firms before funds were infused. It is equivalent to 12.79% 
of the average export ratio of Innofund-backed firms when funds were awarded.  
Models (5) to (8) present the estimation of how Innofund affects newly 
granted patents, which show that Innofund significantly and positively motivates 
firms to generate more patents. Given the count-based nature of the dependent 
variables, Models (5) and (6) are negative binomial models, where the dependent 
variables are the number of the total newly granted patents in that year and the 
number of newly granted invention patents in that year. We prefer the negative 
 binomial model to the Poisson model because the former relaxes the assumption that 
the mean is equal to the variance for the error term. Our results hold when we 
switched to the Poisson model. To check the robustness, Models (7) and (8) are 
estimated using fixed effect panel data models, where the dependent variables are log-
link formulations of the number of the total newly granted patents and the number of 
newly granted invention patents in that year.  
The coefficients of  from Model (5) to Model (8) are significantly 
positive, which indicate that Innofund-backed firms generate more new patents after 
winning Innofund support compared with non-Innofund-backed firms and the same 
firms before funds were infused. In addition, our results remain when we use the one-
year lag for the patent filing time in Model (5). This result shows that Innofund-
backed firms were granted 1.08 more patents of all types per year (which is 136.18% 
of the average total number of newly awarded patents of Innofund-backed firms at the 
time of being supported by Innofund) after winning Innofund compared with non-
Innofund-backed firms and the same firms before the government funds were infused. 
More importantly, improvements in terms of the number of newly granted invention 
patents after firms gained Innofund are more significant. Model (6) shows that 
Innofund-backed firms were granted 1.66 more invention patents per year (which is 
531.41% of the average number of newly granted invention patents of the Innofund-
backed firms at the time of gaining Innofund) than non-Innofund-backed ones and the 
same firms before they received R&D funding from the government. In summary, 
 Table 3 shows that Innofund effectively affects the innovation outputs of the awarded 
firms as measured by new product sales, exports, and patents. 
We also examine the monetary effect of the funding. With the estimation 
focusing on the total amount of Innofund support given to the firms, we may obtain 
more insightful ideas about the extent to which government R&D funding solves the 
financial constraints of firms in China, where resource allocation is biased. We 
moderate our model to estimate the effect of new funding: 
 
 
The key difference between (1.1)/(1.2) and (2.1)/(2.2)is the dummy variable 
, is replaced with the variable .  is equal to the dollar 
amount of Innofund awarded if the firm has gained Innofund support at time t, and 
equals zero if the firm did not gain Innofund or has not gained Innofund yet at time t.  
The results are presented in Table 4. Models (1) and (2) show that InnoAmtit is 
significantly and positively correlated to the new product sales of firms. For example, 
Model (2) shows that 1 million Yuan of Innofund funding increases the new product 
sales ratio of firms by 4.5%, whereas the average new product sales ratio of Innofund-
backed firms when funds were awarded is 16.7%. Models (3) and (4) show that the 
amount of Innofund supports significantly and positively motivates firms to generate 
more exports. For example, Model (4) shows that a funding of 1 million Yuan 
increases the export ratio of firms by 1.6%, whereas the average export ratio of 
 Innofund-backed firms when funds were awarded is 8.6%. The coefficients of 
InnoAftit across Model (5) to Model (8) are significantly positive, suggesting new 
external financial resource can help obtain new patents. For example, Model (5) 
shows that a funding of 1 million Yuan increases the new patents of a firm regardless 
of type by 1.4 yearly. The average of newly awarded patents of Innofund-backed 
firms when funds were awarded is 0.796. Moreover, Innofund has a larger effect on 
the invention patents of firms compared with its effects on patents of all types. Model 
(6) shows that a funding of 1 million Yuan increases the new invention patents of 
firms by 2.2 every year, which is 7.05 times the average of newly awarded invention 
patents of Innofund-backed firms when they received funds. 
It is well noted that the absolute figure of the funds may has different impacts 
on firms’ innovation outputs as firms may face different level of financial constraints. 
We hence use the relative weights of the funds over total profits and the ratio of 
InnoAmt over total free cash of the firm to replace InnoAmt and repeat the 
regressions we conducted in Table 4. But the results show that neither the above-
mentioned relative measures has significant effects on the innovation outputs of the 
firm (we do not present the results to save space).  
4.2 Identification  
Although we have shown the significant and positive relationship between 
Innofund and the innovation outputs of firms, we cannot claim the causality as the 
positive correlation may be caused by other reasons. First of all, the selection of 
 Innofund is not random as mentioned in previous sections.  Firms which are more 
likely to generate innovation outputs in the future may be more likely selected by 
Innofund. Thus, the positive association between the innovation outputs of firms and 
Innofund may be caused by ex-ante selection bias. If this is the case, we can hardly 
distinguish whether it is the Innofund which drives the improvement in the innovation 
outputs of the firms. That is, Innofund-backed firms might have generated the 
increased innovation outputs even without Innofund support. 
In order to control the ex-ante selection effect, we employ a propensity score 
matching (PSM) algorithm proposed by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) to construct 
the control sample. We match Innofund-backed firms with non-Innofund-backed 
firms on multiple dimensions in the year prior to the awarding of the Innofund. In the 
context of our study, the propensity score is the predicted probability of a firm 
winning an Innofund. When constructing the non-Innofund-backed firms on this 
propensity score, we ensure that the matched non-Innofund-backed firms are selected 
based on their two-digit SIC industry code, location, and size measured by total sales, 
exports, new product sales, and the number of patents as suggested by Demurger et al. 
(2002). We control the location to capture the disparities in regional growth rates and 
levels of development, which may affect the results. We also match the size, and 
innovation outputs of Innofund-backed firms and their counterparts. These criteria 
ensure that, Innofund-backed firms and non-Innofund-backed firms are similar in 
many aspects that may affect the innovation outputs of the firms in the future. More 
 specifically, we use one-to-five, nearest-neighbor propensity score matching to 
identify non-Innofund-backed firms. 
After the PSM, we compare the means and medians for export, new product 
sales, and the number of newly granted patents between Innofund-backed firms and 
the firms in the control group  in the year prior Innofund. Both the-tests on means and 
two-tailed Wilcoxon rank-sum tests on medians show that there is no statistically 
significant difference between the two groups in export, new product sales. The t-tests 
are presented in Table A.1.  
We then re-estimate (1.1) and (1.2) based on this newly matched sample. 
Table 5 shows the results of the propensity score matching-based analysis. The results 
of the estimations for the PSM sample, wherein the ex-ante selection effect has been 
controlled, are similar to those of the random sample. The economic magnitudes of 
Innofund on innovation outputs decrease, but they remain statistically significant. 
Model (2) shows that firms experience a 2.8% increase in new product sales ratio 
after winning Innofund, which is 16.77% of the average new product sales ratio of 
Innofund-backed firms when the fund was awarded. Model (4) shows that firms 
experience a 0.8% increase in export outputs ratio after winning Innofund, which is 
9.3% of the average export ratio of Innofund-backed firms when the fund was 
awarded. Model (5) shows that firms are granted 0.56 more patents of all types per 
year after winning Innofund. The average of newly granted patents of Innofund-
backed firms at the time of being awarded the fund is 0.796. Model (6) shows that 
firms gain 1.01 more invention patents than non-Innofund-backed firms per year after 
 winning Innofund while the average newly granted invention patents of Innofund-
backed firms when they received the fund is 0.312. In summary, the above estimates 
suggest that Innofund-backed firms outperform non-Innofund-backed firms in terms 
of new product sales, exports, and newly awarded patents after potential ex-ante 
selection effects are controlled by using PSM approach.  
One significant limitation of the PSM methodology is its incapability of 
capturing the effects of unobservable variables. Missing variables instead of Innofund, 
may contribute to improved innovation outputs. For instance, we are not able to 
measure the R&D ability of the firms or to observe the management capability of the 
executives based on the existing data while both factors may contribute to the 
innovation outputs of the firms. To address the identification concerns of 
unobservable variables, we use an instrumental variable to identify the firms that won 
Innofund. A proper instrumental variable must be correlated to the endogenous 
variable while unrelated with the unobserved variables that may affect dependent 
variables, which are the innovation outputs of the firms in this case. 
Our main concern is identifying the variable that represents firms that won 
Innofund. We use the number of firms in high-tech zones in the city where a firm is 
located at a given year to identify the probability of the firm winning Innofund. High-
tech zones are a special type of special economic zone (SEZ) in China, wherein 
central and local governments seek to stimulate corporate R&D activities. The total 
number of the high-tech firms in local high-tech zones signals the overall 
development of corporate R&D capability and the supply of strong high-tech firms. 
 This measure is a good instrumental variable for our estimations because of the higher 
probability of the local firms to be selected by Innofund when more high-tech firms 
are in a locality. However, this variable should not be related to firm-specific 
innovation outputs, which are our dependent variables, because this is a city-level 
variable.  
The results of the 2SLS based on the random sample are reported in Table 6. 
Panel A of Table 6 presents the results from the 1st stage estimation, which shows that 
the number of firms in local high-tech zones is significantly and positively correlated 
to whether a firm wins Innofund at a given year. This result suggests a greater 
probability of receiving Innofund when a city has better-developed corporate R&D 
capability and larger supply of high-tech firms. This first stage estimation confirms 
the relevance of the instrumental variable. The results of the 2nd stage estimation are 
presented in Panel B of Table 6. Models (1) and (2) show that firms generate more 
new product sales after they gained Innofund compared with non-Innofund firms and 
the same firms before receiving Innofund support. Similar results were observed in 
exports and the number of patents. In general, the results of 2SLS are consistent with 
the regression results in Tables 3 and 4. To further check the robustness of the results, 
we repeated the 2SLS for the samples matched by PSM. The results are shown in the 
appendix (Table A.2). The main conclusions remain after we control for the potential 
ex-ante selection effect. 
These results empirically show that winning an Innofund has positive effects 
on innovation outputs even after accounting for the endogenous nature of Innofund. 
 5. Project screening systems and Innofund effects 
As mentioned in Section 2, the project screening system experienced a 
significant change in 2005. The major feature of this change is that the central 
government substantially delegated the decision-making power during project 
screening to local Innofund offices. As R&D projects are associated with high level of 
uncertainty, any investment in such projects including government R&D funding has 
to heavily depend on screening mechanisms. Hence, we ask whether the change in ex-
ante screening systems might affect the effects of the Innofund on the innovation 
outputs of the firms. 
Sah and Stiglitz (1991) argue that the quality of project selection may depend 
on the structure of organizations because the rationality of human beings is bounded 
and information gathering, transmission, and processing are costly. The authors 
suggest, at the same level of evaluating costs, the hierarchical organizations might 
delay project selection, reject good projects, and reduce the total number of project 
portfolios. By contrast, decentralized organizations may speed up the selection 
process and increase the number of selections by reducing communication costs and 
information issues. However, decentralized decision-making might accept bad 
projects. Consequently, the authors suggest that the relative performance of 
decentralized project evaluation is better than that of centralized project evaluation if 
the portfolio quality is better. Following this information approach, Aghion and Tirole 
(1997) emphasize the trade-off between loss of control and the ex-ante incentives of 
the agents to acquire information under decentralization. The authors argue that the 
 level of decentralization of decision-making should depend on the size of the 
organization, the load and feature of the information passage, the multiplicity of the 
supervisors, and the urgency and complexity of the decisions to be made. Hart and 
Moore (2005) show how the trade-off between loss of control and information could 
explain why generalists command specialists in many hierarchies. Dessein (2002) 
develops a model, wherein decentralization to a specialized agent entails a loss of 
control for the principal, but at the same time reduces the incentive of the agent to 
miscommunicate information to the principal. Stein (2002) further suggests that 
decentralized organizations are more attractive when the information needed is 
“softer,” whereas centralized organizations are more favorable when the information 
needed can be “hardened” without cost. The more recent discussion by Ahgion et al. 
(2013) discusses the interwoven effects of market competition, firm dynamics, and 
innovation.  
Another strand of research on the decentralization of decision-making is 
mainly derived from soft budget constraints (SBC) theory. Dewatripont and Maskin 
(1995) suggest that a centralized credit market might affect efficiency, whereas the 
decentralization of credit might promote efficient project selection when creditors are 
not fully informed ex-ante about project quality. The authors attribute the inefficiency 
of the centralized system to a problem of adverse selection and refinancing as a moral 
hazard. Qian and Xu (1998) further extend this discussion in the context of innovation 
investment when information issues are profound and distinguishing the quality of the 
project by ex-ante screening is difficult. The authors suggest that bureaucracy results 
 in more mistakes by rejecting promising projects and delays innovation. Efficiency 
loss caused by soft financial constraints increases as prior knowledge becomes worse 
and as research stage investment requirements become lower. By contrast, 
decentralized decision-making may not only reduce ex-ante screening costs, but may 
also commit to terminate bad projects ex-post so that both types of errors mentioned 
earlier may be reduced. Thus, decentralized organizations may increase the number of 
selected projects and reduce errors in accepting or continuing re-financing bad 
projects when investing in innovation. This effect should be more obvious in 
investment when the uncertainty is higher and the quality of the projects is harder to 
predict ex-ante. However, centralized decision-making systems may be more efficient 
when the technology of the innovation is more certain.  
Empirically, some recent studies examine organizational forms and innovation 
from different aspects. Rajan and Wulf (2006) show a strong movement towards 
flatter corporations in the US between 1986 and 1999. Caroli and Van Reenen (2001) 
report a positive association between decentralization and the development of 
information technology. Baker and Hubbard (2004) document the effect of new 
technologies on ownership patterns in the US trucking industry. Acemoglu et al. 
(2007) examine the relationship between the diffusion of new technologies and the 
decentralization of firms. Using firm-level data in France and UK, the authors find 
that firms closer to the technological frontier, firms in more heterogeneous 
environments, and younger firms are more likely to choose decentralization. Based on 
data from the US, Arora et al. (2011) distinguish the effects of organization of R&D 
 activities by focusing on the trade-offs between responsiveness to immediate and 
local business needs and the type of research that can benefit firms as a whole. The 
authors find that centralized R&D tends be more scientific and broader in scope, has 
more technical impact. However, firms with a more decentralized structure, on 
average, invest less in R&D, generate fewer patents per R&D investment, and exhibit 
greater sales growth and higher market value.  
All the above-mentioned studies focus on the efficiency of the decision-
making and the organizational forms of for-profit organizations. None of these papers 
investigate the relationship between decentralization (or organizational change) and 
investment decision-making for public subsidy programs.  
The above-mentioned theories and empirical studies suggest three potential 
consequences of the change in the Innofund project screening system in 2005 in 
China. Given that the Innofund program targets young firms with advanced 
technology potentials in some frontier industries, we expect these projects to be 
associated with high level of uncertainty and severe information issues. Based on the 
existing literature (Sah and Stiglitz, 1991; Qian and Xu, 1998; Ahgion and Tirole, 
1997; Hart and Moore, 2005), first, we expect that the decentralized screening system 
after 2005 will help in selecting better quality projects compared with the centralized 
screening process before 2005. The effects of Innofund on entrepreneurial firms 
should be consequently stronger after 2005. Second, the better the portfolio of the 
firms is, the higher the probability is to enhance the effects of the decentralized 
screening system (Sah and Stiglitz, 1991). Third, the more competitive the market is 
 and the better the institutions are, the stronger the impact of the decentralization on 
the Innofund effects we should expect (Ahgion et al., 2013).  
To test whether a significant change occurred in terms of the Innofund effects 
on the innovation of a firm after the change in the project screening systems, we 
conduct a series regressions for innovation outputs by distinguishing firms backed by 
Innofund before and after 2005 and their non-Innofund-backed counterparts. The 
regressions equations are as follows:  
 
 
While all the variables stay as same as Equations (1.1) and (2.2), we replace 
the Innofund dummy variable with two dummy variables to specify the Innofund-
backed firms before and after 2005. Inno_2005Bef is a dummy variable that is equals 
to 1 if the firm has gained Innofund support at time t and the Innofund was granted 
before 2005 and equals zero otherwise. Inno_2005Aft is a dummy variable that is 
equal to 1 if the firm has gained Innofund support at time t and the first Innofund was 
granted after 2005 and equals zero otherwise.  
Table 7 reports the regression results for the effects of the change in the 
screening system. Models (1) and (2) show that Inno_2005Bef and Inno_2005Aft are 
significantly and positively correlated with new product sales measured by absolute 
number and relative ratio, which is consistent with the findings shown in Table 3. 
More importantly, we find that the coefficient of Inno_2005Bef is smaller than that of 
 Inno_2005Aft in both regression models. The difference between the two is 
statistically significant.  For example, Model (2) shows that firms selected before 
2005 experience a higher new product sales ratio by 2.4% after wining Innofund, 
whereas firms selected after 2005 have 4.5% higher new product sales compared with 
their non-Innofund counterparts and the same firms before they gained Innofund. 
Similar results are shown with the absolute number of total new product sales. The 
results indicate that the effects of Innofund supports on the new product sales of firms 
significantly improved after the policy change in 2005 when the screening system 
became more decentralized. 
Models (3) and (4) present the effects of Innofund before and after 2005 on the 
exports of the firms. Inno_2005Bef and Inno_2005Aft are significantly and 
positively correlated to export measured by absolute number and relative ratio. The 
coefficient of Inno_2005Aft is 1.62%, which is almost twice that of Inno_2005Bef 
(0.82%) in Model (4). The results suggest that the effects of Innofund on exports 
significantly increased compared with the effects before 2005 after project screening 
became more decentralized in 2005.  
We find consistent findings regarding the effects of Innofund on the patent 
generation of firms before and after 2005. Models (5) and (6) present negative 
binomial regressions, where the dependent variables are the total number of patents 
(all types) and the number of invention patents newly granted in that year. Models (7) 
and (8) show the fixed effect panel data models. This result shows that Inno_2005Bef 
and Inno_2005Aft are significantly and positively associated with newly granted 
 patents of all types, whereas the coefficients of Inno_2005Aft are consistently 
significantly larger than those of Inno_2005Bef in any regression model. This finding 
confirms that the significant improvement of Innofund effects on innovation after 
project screening was systematically changed from a centralized system into a 
relatively decentralized one in 2005.  
We further divide the sample into two subsamples to address the effects of the 
policy change in project screening: (1) the subsample that only includes the firms 
backed by Innofund before 2005 and their non-Innofund-backed counterparts; and (2) 
the subsample that only includes the firms backed by Innofund after 2005 and their 
non-Innofund-backed counterparts. The results the two subsamples are shown in the 
Appendix (Table A.3). The results reconfirm that the degree of the effects of Innofund 
is different, even if both firms backed before 2005 and after 2005 generate more 
innovation outputs than non-Innofund-backed ones. Innofund infused after 2005 when 
the screening system became more decentralized has significantly more positive 
effects on the innovation outputs of firms than Innofund infused before 2005. The 
results are consistent with the arguments of Sah and Stiglitz (1991), Ahgion and 
Tirole (1997), and Qian and Xu (1998), which favor a more decentralized screening 
system for investing in R&D oriented projects when the degree of uncertainty is 
higher and the information issues is more severe.  
6. The Cross-Market Heterogeneity of Innofund Effects 
 In the previous section, we looked at the effects of the Innofund policy change 
on project screening and show that more decentralized screening increased the effects 
of Innofund on the innovation outputs of firms. Few other questions follow that are 
associated with this question. First is whether the effects of Innofund differ across 
regions given that China is large and heterogeneous in both institutional aspects and 
the economic endowments (Xu, 2011). Second, if we find cross-region heterogeneity 
of the Innofund effects, are the cross-region effects more significant after 2005 when 
the project screening power is more delegated to local governments?  
First, we examine the cross-market heterogeneity of Innofund effects by 
conducting a set of regressions as follows:  
 
 
 
We then look at whether the change in the project screening system in 2005 
influences the effects of regional heterogeneity on the innovation outputs of the 
Innofund program. According to Sah and Stiglitz (1991), decentralized organizations 
may be more effective in selecting a larger number of quality projects when the 
portfolio is better. If this is the case, we should expect that the effects of the 2005 
change found in the last section increase in a more advanced market where a larger 
number of better firms is supplied. Additionally, Aghion and Tirole (1997) and Hart 
 and Moore (2005) suggest that more valuable local information results in more 
superior knowledge of local managers and more efficient delegation of decision-
making to local decision-makers. We expect regions with higher levels of competition 
and better institutions to use the local government to seek for information and assess 
the quality of projects better because R&D projects have a higher level of uncertainty 
and profound information issues. Consequently, the Innofund effects after 2005 might 
be increased in economically and institutionally more advanced regions. We conduct 
the following set of regressions to address these questions:  
 
 
Other variables remain similar to regression Equations (3.1) and (3.2), we add 
a series of variables that measure the characteristics of a region represented by Mrt in 
Equations (4.1) and (4.2). We also include the interaction terms between InnoAft and 
Mrt to capture the cross-region effects of the Innofund Program. We then include the 
interaction terms of Mrt and Inno_2005Aft and the interaction terms of Mrt and 
Inno_2005Bef in Equations (4.3) and (4.4) to capture the across-region effects of 
Innofund before and after the 2005 policy change.  
We focus on two major aspects of the regions. First, we look at the economic 
aspects of the region. We divide the regions into two groups using DVP, a dummy 
 variable that is equal to 1 if the province is defined as a developed region in a given 
year by the State Statistical Bureau, and equals 0 otherwise. Second, we look at the 
marketization of the region indicated by Mrt in the equations. We use two market 
indexes defined in Fan et al. (2009):  Pri indicates the share of the total non-SOEs in a 
given province in a given year; Instn represents the quality of institutions in a given 
province in a given year which is measured by the development of local institutions, 
including patent protection departments, law firms, and accounting firms.  
We focus on the above-mentioned regional measurements for several reasons. 
First, developed regions may have a larger number of firms that invest in innovation 
compared with less developed regions. The chance of selecting more innovative firms 
in regions with more advanced economic development should be higher because of 
the high supply of potential candidates for the Innofund program. Moreover, the 2005 
policy change requires local governments to match the funds with at least 50% of the 
total support before they make recommendations. Hence, richer provinces may have 
more incentives to submit more projects and consequently gain more chances to be 
selected by the Innofund compared with poorer regions after 2005. Moreover, richer 
regions may have a larger portfolio of quality firms than poorer regions, which is 
expected to strengthen the effects of decentralized screening system (Sah and Stiglitz, 
1991; Qian and Xu, 1998). Thus, we expect that a more economically developed 
region is more likely to enjoy more benefits from the delegation of the project 
screening after the 2005 policy change.  
Second, innovations are normally generated by SMEs and Innofund aims to 
 support SMEs. Most of SMEs in China are private firms. Regions with a larger 
private sector are normally more market-oriented with a higher level of competition. 
This phenomenon is more obviously seen after the late 1990s, when the state 
privatized most smaller sized SOEs with the “Capturing the large firms while letting 
the small firms go” policy. We expect markets in regions with a larger private sector 
to be more competitive and to have a larger supply of more innovative firms 
compared with regions with a smaller private sector. Hence, Innofund effects should 
be more significant in regions with a larger private sector. We also expect local 
Innofund office in a region with a larger private sector to produce fewer errors in 
terms of accepting bad projects compared with others regions when the screening 
became more decentralized after 2005. Similarly, we also expect the more developed 
the local institutions are, the more likely the local governments have better channel to 
gain information of the projects and hence increase the project selection quality and 
enlarge the Innofund effects. Furthermore, the effects of institutions should be more 
significant after the screening becomes decentralized after 2005 when the local 
decisions are given more weight.  
Table 8 reports the empirical results of the across-region effects. Panel A of 
Table 8 shows the effects of the economic development of the region. In general, it 
suggests that Innofund effects are seen more significant in more economically 
developed regions.  Models (1) and (2) show that the interaction term between 
InnoAft and DVP is positively and significantly correlated with new product sales 
measured by both absolute number and relative ratio. Similar results are observed in 
 Models (6), (7), and (8), where we estimate the effects of Innofund on newly granted 
patents across regions with different level of economic development. However, the 
interaction terms do not have statistically significant relationship with on the exports 
of the firms.   
Panel B of Table 8 presents how private sector development may influence the 
effect of Innofund on innovation. These results show that the interaction term between 
InnoAft and Pri is significantly and positively correlated with new product sales, 
exports, and newly granted patents from Model (1) to (8). This finding implies that 
the effects of Innofund are apparently more significant in provinces with more 
developed private sector. Panel C of Table 8 shows the relationship between the 
development of legal institutions and the effects of Innofund. Similar to the results in 
Panel B, the interaction term between InnoAft and Instn is significantly and 
positively associated with all measures of innovation, which suggests that Innofund 
has a stronger effect on innovation outputs in provinces with better institutions for 
business activities.  
Table 9 shows the effects of the 2005 policy change on the cross-region 
effects of the Innofund program. Panel A shows the results with the focus on the 
economic development of the region. Models (1) and (2) show that the interaction 
term of Inno_2005Bef and DVP and the interaction term of Inno_2005Aft and DVP 
are positively and significantly correlated with new product sales measured by 
absolute number and relative ratio. However, the coefficients of the interaction term 
of Inno_2005Aft and DVP are significantly larger than those of the interaction term 
 of Inno_2005Bef and DVP. Similar results are observed in Models (5) and (6), where 
we estimate the effects of the Innofund on newly granted patents. However, the 
interaction terms had no significant effects on exports.  The results suggest that, in 
general, the effects of the Innofund on the new product sales and the newly granted 
patents of firms increased in more economically developed regions after the 2005 
policy change compared with other regions.  
Panel B of Table 9 presents the empirical results regarding the effects of the 
2005 policy change, with a focus on the development of the private sector. The results 
are consistent with our predictions. On the one hand, the share of the private sector in 
a region is significantly and positively associated with new product sales, exports, and 
newly granted patents. On the other hand, new products sales and newly granted 
patents significantly increased with the increase in the interaction terms of 
Inno_2005Bef and Pri and the interaction terms of Inno_2005Aft and Pri. However, 
the coefficients of the interaction terms of Inno_2005Bef and Pri is significantly 
larger than those of the interaction terms of Inno_2005Aft and Pri suggesting the 2005 
policy change have different effects on the Innofund impacts across region. A 
province with a more developed private sector is more likely to experience more 
Innofund effects on innovation. Moreover, this impact is magnified after 2005.  
Finally, Panel C of Table 9 reports the estimation results of the cross-region 
effects of Innofund with a focus on the development of local institutions. We show 
that the Innofund effects on innovation depend on local institutions and the screening 
system. We observe more significant and positive effects of Innofund on innovation 
 in provinces with more developed institutions for business activities compared with 
those of provinces with less developed institutions. Moreover, the positive effects of 
Innofund and institutions appear to be magnified after 2005 policy change when the 
project screening system is more decentralized.  
7. Conclusion  
This paper estimates the effects of Innofund on the innovation outputs of firms. 
Innofund is the largest Chinese government program targeting R&D of SMEs in 
China. We study its general effects on innovation outputs of firms. We also examine 
how institutions affect the influences of Innofund by exploring the policy change and 
institutional variations over time and across regions.  
Based on the results of firm-level panel data analysis, we find that Innofund-
backed firms generate significantly more innovation outputs by new product sales, 
exports, and newly granted patents, compared with non-Innofund-backed firms and 
the same firms before Innofund funding was infused. We use PSM methodology to 
control the selection issues. Moreover, we use two-staged Heckman estimations to 
address the identification problems. The results remain robust. These findings are 
consistent with most existing literature, which indicates that government funding 
stimulates corporate R&D activities (Irwin and Klenow 1996; Griliches and Regev, 
1998; Audretsch et al., 2002; Lach, 2002; Görg and Strobl, 2006).  
However, we find that Innofund effects are different before and after 2005 
when decision-making in the project selection process was transformed from a 
 centralized process into a relatively decentralized one. That is, the effect of Innofund 
on the innovation outputs of firms further improved when project screening became 
more decentralized. Finally, we find Innfound effects and the 2005 policy effects are 
heterogeneous across-markets. The more economically and institutionally developed 
the market is, the stronger the Innofund effects and the project selection 
decentralization effects appear. These results are consistent with Sah and Stiglitz 
(1991), Ahgion and Tirole (1997), Hart and Moore (2005), Qian and Xu (1998) and 
Allen et al. (2012). 
This study contributes to literature in three aspects. First, this study is the first 
systematic examination on government supported corporate R&D program in China, 
where the institutions are substantially different from those in developed market 
economies. Second, our estimations of the across-region effects within a country 
further shows that institutions affect how government R&D programs work. It 
suggests local government incentives play an important role in R&D financing. 
Thirdly, we extend the existing studies by looking further at the project screening 
systems and their influence on the effects of government R&D programs that have 
been largely neglected by extant literature. Our study provides a new perspective for 
evaluating government R&D policy and policy implications. Thus, this study 
contributes not only to understanding government R&D financing, but also to 
literature on R&D financing mechanisms in general.  
This study raises several questions for further research. First, if government 
R&D programs indeed contribute to the innovation outputs of the firms, are 
 innovation outputs transferred to improvements in productivity or profitability of the 
firms at the same time? Second, apart from project screening schemes, can other 
mechanisms affect the effects of government R&D funding, such as financial budget 
constraints (Qian and Xu, 1998; Huang and Xu, 1999); the competition in product and 
input markets, or, trust and relationships (Allen, et al., 2012)? If so, how do different 
mechanisms work together or interact to each other? Third, do different forms of 
government R&D programs have different effects? If so, what are the 
explanations/mechanisms for the differences observed? Finally, do government R&D 
programs have spillover effects? 
 Table 1: Industry and Year Distribution of the Sampled Innofund-backed Firms 
This table reports the industry and year distribution of the Innofund-backed firms and projects.  Panel A is the industry distribution of the Innofund-backed firms by two-digit 
SIC codes. Panel B is the year distribution of Innofund-backed firms and projects from 1999 to 2011.  
Panel A: Industry Distribution         Panel B: Year Distribution of Innofund-backed firms and Projects   
Industry Description 
two-
digit  
SIC 
code 
No. of  
Innofund-
backed 
firms 
Percent  Innoyear 
No. of  
Innofund-backed firms Percent 
No. of  
projects Percent 
Raw Chemical Materials and  
Chemical Products 26 306 11.60  1999 293 11.11 1,089 3.57 
Medicines 27 401 15.20  2000 217 8.23 869 2.85 
General Purpose Machinery 35 268 10.16  2001 204 7.73 1,008 3.30 
Special Purpose Machinery 36 336 12.74  2002 192 7.28 780 2.55 
Transport Equipment 37 125 4.74  2003 230 8.72 1,197 3.92 
Electrical Machinery and Equipment 39 206 7.81  2004 345 13.08 1,464 4.79 
Communication Equipment, 
Computers and Other Electronic 
Equipment 
40 353 13.38  2005 465 17.63 1,552 5.08 
Measuring Instruments and 
Machinery  
for Cultural Activity and Office 
Work 
41 173 6.56  2006 327 12.40 1,905 6.24 
others  470 17.81  2007 365 13.84 2,113 6.92 
Total  2,638 100  2008 2,638 100 2,470 8.09 
     2009   5,847 19.15 
     2010   3,709 12.15 
     2011   6,534 21.40 
     Total   30,537 100 
 Table 2: Summary Statistics of Innofund- and non-Innofund-backed Firms 
Panel A: Observation Comparison between Innofund- and non-Innofund-backed Firms          
Variable Innofund-backed Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max   
non-
Innofund-
backed 
Obs 
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
New product sales (1000 RMB) 15,602 12,808.30 28,013.29 0 142,572  55,624 2,508.29 12,213.83 0 142,572 
New product sales ratio  15,546 0.16 0.28 0 1  55,092 0.05 0.17 0 1 
Export (1000 RMB) 15,602 10,305.47 33,984.29 0 295,684  55,624 6,238.61 25,123.21 0 295,684 
Export ratio 15,546 0.09 0.21 0 3.46  55,092 0.11 0.28 0 8.98 
Patent (number) 18,224 0.70 2.84 0 117  64,474 0.10 0.80 0 46 
Invention (number) 18,224 0.25 1.34 0 75  64,474 0.02 0.34 0 37 
Firm_age 18,222 10.07 7.41 0 29  64,456 10.16 7.59 0 29 
State-owned capital (1000 RMB) 18,224 2,475.01 9,831.65 0 206,920  64,474 1,404.80 7,055.41 0 322,324 
Paid-in capital  (1000 RMB) 18,224 22,962.44 35,742.87 0 295,452  64,473 12,184.77 27,750.72 0 489,554 
State_shr  ratio 18,079 0.11 0.28 0 1  63,530 0.13 0.32 0 1 
Total liability (1000 RMB) 18,224 56,849.24 93,971.49 0 776,643  64,474 24,605.14 53,598.09 0 776,643 
Total asset (1000 RMB) 18,224 102,038.00 163,731.40 0 1,596,637  64,472 42,141.18 87,660.30 0 1,427,323 
Leverage ratio 18,176 0.56 0.25 0 13  64,145 0.61 0.34 0 16 
Sales (1000 RMB) 18,224 83,690.62 148,757.60 0 1,302,231   64,474 41,148.86 87,107.16 0 1,302,231 
 
 
 
 
     
  
Panel B: Innofund- and non-Innofund-backed Firms in the Year of the Fund Infused           
Variable 
Innofund-
backed  
Obs 
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max   
non-
Innofund-
backed 
Obs 
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
New product sales (1000 RMB) 2,293 10,090.26 22,220.73 0 142,572  10,461 1,822.48 9,656.56 0 142,572 
New product sales ratio  2,285 0.17 0.30 0 1  10,316 0.05 0.17 0 1 
Export (1000 RMB) 2,293 7,199.95 25,937.70 0 295,684  10,461 4,612.95 19,271.66 0 295,684 
Export ratio 2,285 0.09 0.22 0 3.46  10,316 0.10 0.27 0 2.14 
Patent (number) 2,638 0.80 3.40 0 89  12,025 0.09 0.83 0 46 
Invention (number) 2,638 0.31 1.84 0 68  12,025 0.02 0.33 0 23 
Firm_age 2,637 8.42 6.92 0 29  12,016 8.80 7.42 0 29 
State-owned capital (1000 RMB) 2,638 2,051.26 9,017.00 0 111,020  12,025 1,034.99 5,959.05 0 111,020 
Paid-in capital (1000 RMB)  2,638 18,371.17 28,204.86 0 295,452  12,024 10,064.05 24,063.67 0 295,452 
State_shr  ratio 2,620 0.09 0.25 0 1  11,761 0.11 0.30 0 1 
Total liability (1000 RMB) 2,638 41,821.89 67,233.01 0 776,643  12,025 19,501.68 44,116.28 0 776,643 
Total asset (1000 RMB) 2,638 74,526.55 111,610.90 0 1,287,128  12,025 33,053.51 69,236.54 0 1,287,128 
Leverage ratio 2,632 0.55 0.22 0 1.99  11,909 0.60 0.39 0 15.70 
Sales (1000 RMB) 2,638 63,185.95 98,716.90 0 1,241,706   12,025 33,387.11 69,676.80 0 1,302,231 
 Table 3: Innovation Outputs of Innofund Supports (Random-Draw Sample)   
This table reports the fixed effects panel data regressions of Innofund on innovation outputs of the firms based on 18224 observations from 2638 Innofund-based firms and 
64474 observations from 12025 randomly selected non-Innofund-backed firms across 1999 and 2007. InnoAft is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the firm has gained 
Innofund support at time t, and equals zero otherwise. Innovation outputs are measured by the natural logarithm of new product sales of the firm (Lnnewpro), ratio of total 
new product sales over total sales of the firm (newproratio), natural logarithm of export volume of the firm (Lnexport), ratio of total export volume over total sales of the 
firm (exportratio), total number of newly granted patents of the firm (patent) and total number of newly granted invention patents of the firm (invention) in a given year. 
Firm size (Firm_size) is measured by the natural logarithm of the annual sales of the firm in a given year. Leverage is the ratio of total liability over the total assets of the 
firm in a given year.  State_Shr is the ratio of state ownership over the total equity of a firm in a given year. We also control firm age, and year and firm fixed effects. Model 
(1), (2), (3), (4), (7) and (8) are fixed effect panel data models while Model (5) and (6) are negative binomial models. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Correlations 
significant at the 90% confidence level are presented with one asterisk (*), those significant at the 95% level are presented in bold with two asterisks (**), and those 
significant at the 99% level are presented with three asterisks (***). 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 lnnewpro newproratio lnexport exportratio patent invention lnpatent lninvention 
InnoAft 0.773*** 0.031*** 0.564*** 0.011*** 1.084*** 1.658*** 0.151*** 0.100*** 
 -0.089 -0.006 (0.068) (0.004) (0.039) (0.053) (0.011) (0.007) 
Firm_age -0.018 -0.001 0.019* 0.001 -0.002 -0.004 -0.001 0.000 
 -0.015 -0.001 (0.010) (0.001) (0.003) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) 
State_Shr 0.103 0.003 0.048 -0.003 0.102 0.117 -0.006 -0.005 
 -0.09 -0.005 (0.062) (0.003) (0.068) (0.104) (0.008) (0.005) 
Leverage -0.086 -0.011** 0.084 0.003 -0.317*** -0.625*** -0.006 -0.008*** 
 -0.062 (0.005) (0.061) (0.004) (0.067) (0.098) (0.005) (0.003) 
Firm_size 0.313*** 0.003** 0.420*** 0.010*** 0.344*** 0.386*** 0.020*** 0.008*** 
 -0.021 (0.002) (0.021) (0.001) (0.015) (0.021) (0.002) (0.001) 
_cons -1.449*** 0.048*** -2.261*** 0.011 -5.624*** -7.697*** -0.168*** -0.083*** 
 (0.225) (0.016) (0.222) (0.014) (0.266) (0.749) (0.024) (0.014) 
Year and Firm Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y N N Y Y 
N 70,247 69,937 70,247 69,937 81,584 81,584 81,584 81,584 
adj. R-sq 0.023 0.005 0.041 0.004   0.032 0.034 
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 Table 4 Innovation Outputs and The Amount of Innofund Supports (Random-Draw Sample)   
This table reports the fixed effects panel regressions of the amount of Innofund supports on innovation outputs of the firms based on 18224 observations from 2638 Innofund-
based firms and 64474 observations from 12025 randomly selected non-Innofund-backed firms across 1999 and 2007. InnoAmt is equal to the dollar amount of Innofund 
awarded if the firm has gained Innofund support at time t, and equals zero if the firm did not gain Innofund or has not gained Innofund yet at time t. Innovation outputs are 
measured by the nature logarithm of new product sales of the firm (Lnnewpro), ratio of total new product sales over total sales of the firm (newproratio), nature logarithm of 
export volume of the firm (Lnexport), ratio of total export volume over total sales of the firm (exportratio), total number of newly granted patents of the firm (patent) and 
total number of newly granted invention patents of the firm (invention) in a given year. Firm size (Firm_size) is measured by the natural logarithm of the annual sales of the 
firm in a given year. Leverage is the ratio of total liability over the total assets of the firm in a given year.  State_Shr is the ratio of state ownership over the total equity of a 
firm in a given year. We also control firm age, and year and firm fixed effects. Model (1), (2), (3), (4), (7) and (8) are fixed effect panel data models while Model (5) and (6) 
are negative binomial models. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Correlations significant at the 90% confidence level are presented with one asterisk (*), those 
significant at the 95% level are presented in bold with two asterisks (**), and those significant at the 99% level are presented with three asterisks (***). 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 lnnewpro newproratio lnexport exportratio patent invention lnpatent lninvention 
InnoAmt 0.011*** 0.0005*** 0.008*** 0.0002*** 0.014*** 0.022*** 0.002*** 0.001*** 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) Firm_age -0.019 -0.001 0.019* 0.001 -0.003 -0.006* -0.001 0.0004 
 (0.015) (0.001) (0.010) (0.001) (0.003) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) State_Shr 0.102 0.003 0.047 -0.003 0.103 0.114 -0.006 -0.005 
 (0.091) (0.005) (0.062) (0.003) (0.068) (0.105) (0.008) (0.005) Leverage -0.087 -0.011** 0.083 0.003 -0.316*** -0.628*** -0.006 -0.008*** 
 (0.062) (0.005) (0.061) (0.004) (0.067) (0.098) (0.005) (0.003) Firm_size 0.314*** 0.003** 0.422*** 0.010*** 0.341*** 0.381*** 0.020*** 0.008*** 
 (0.021) (0.002) (0.022) (0.001) (0.015) (0.021) (0.002) (0.001) _cons -1.455*** 0.048*** -2.267*** 0.011 -5.572*** -7.577*** -0.170*** -0.084*** 
 (0.225) (0.016) (0.222) (0.014) (0.267) (0.750) (0.024) (0.014) Year and Firm Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y N N Y Y 
N 70,247 69,937 70,247 69,937 81,584 81,584 81,584 81,584 
adj. R-sq 0.023 0.005 0.041 0.004   0.031 0.033 P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 Table 5 Innovation Outputs and Innofund Supports (PSM Sample) 
This table reports the fixed effects panel regressions of Innofund on innovation outputs of the firms based on 18224 observations from 2638 Innofund-based firms and 
64991observations from 10739 non-Innofund-backed firms selected by propensity score matching approach across 1999 and 2007. InnoAft is a dummy variable that is equal 
to 1 if the firm has gained Innofund support at time t, and equals zero otherwise. Innovation outputs are measured by the natural logarithm of new product sales of the firm 
(Lnnewpro), ratio of total new product sales over total sales of the firm (newproratio), natural logarithm of export volume of the firm (Lnexport), ratio of total export volume 
over total sales of the firm (exportratio), total number of newly granted patents of the firm (patent) and total number of newly granted invention patents of the firm (invention) 
in a given year. Firm size (Firm_size) is measured by the natural logarithm of the annual sales of the firm in a given year. Leverage is the ratio of total liability over the total 
assets of the firm in a given year.  State_Shr is the ratio of state ownership over the total equity of a firm in a given year. We also control firm age, and year and firm fixed 
effects. Model (1), (2), (3), (4), (7) and (8) are fixed effect panel data models while Model (5) and (6) are negative binomial models. Standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. Correlations significant at the 90% confidence level are presented with one asterisk (*), those significant at the 95% level are presented in bold with two 
asterisks (**), and those significant at the 99% level are presented with three asterisks (***).   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 lnnewpro newproratio lnexport exportratio patent invention lnpatent lninvention 
InnoAft 0.582*** 0.028*** 0.416*** 0.008** 0.563*** 1.016*** 0.132*** 0.086*** 
 (0.091) (0.006) (0.068) (0.004) (0.032) (0.047) (0.011) (0.007) 
Firm_age -0.016 -0.0005 0.014 0.0002 -0.015*** -0.019*** -0.002 0.001 
 (0.019) (0.001) (0.011) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) 
State_Shr 0.189* 0.003 0.157** 0.001 0.059 0.247*** -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.099) (0.006) (0.068) (0.003) (0.048) (0.083) (0.010) (0.005) 
Leverage -0.194*** -0.019*** 0.074 0.005 -0.263*** -0.553*** -0.020*** -0.010** 
 (0.073) (0.006) (0.056) (0.003) (0.048) (0.082) (0.008) (0.004) 
Firm_size 0.580*** 0.009*** 0.530*** 0.009*** 0.307*** 0.382*** 0.043*** 0.015*** 
 (0.027) (0.002) (0.025) (0.001) (0.011) (0.017) (0.003) (0.001) 
_cons -3.274*** 0.025 -3.021*** 0.018 -4.759*** -6.485*** -0.33*** -0.140*** 
 (0.303) (0.019) (0.264) (0.014) (0.164) (0.355) (0.034) (0.017) 
Year and Firm Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y N N Y Y 
N 71,421 71,267 71,421 71,267 83,215 83,215 83,215 83,215 
adj. R-sq 0.032 0.006 0.049 0.005   0.022 0.030 
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 Table 6: 2SLS Regressions for Innofund and Innovation Outputs   
This table reports the 2SLS regressions for Innofund effects based on randomly selected sample. Panel A shows 
the first stage of the estimations and Panel B presents the second stage estimations. Ln(firmno) is the 
instrumental variable to predict whether a specific firm might be supported by Innofund in a given year. It is the 
total number of firms in high-tech zones in a given city in a given year. The dependent variable in Panel A is 
InnoAft which is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the firm has gained Innofund support at time t, and 
equals zero otherwise. The dependent variables in Panel B are measurements for innovation outputs which are 
measured by the natural logarithm of new product sales of the firm (Lnnewpro), ratio of total new product sales 
over total sales of the firm (newproratio), natural logarithm of export volume of the firm (Lnexport), ratio of 
total export volume over total sales of the firm (exportratio), total number of newly granted patents of the firm 
(patent) and total number of newly granted invention patents of the firm (invention) in a given year. Firm size 
(Firm_size) is measured by the natural logarithm of the annual sales of the firm in a given year. Leverage is the 
ratio of total liability over the total assets of the firm in a given year.  State_Shr is the ratio of state ownership 
over the total equity of a firm in a given year. We also control firm age, and year and firm fixed effects. Standard 
errors are reported in parentheses. Correlations significant at the 90% confidence level are presented with one 
asterisk (*), those significant at the 95% level are presented in bold with two asterisks (**), and those significant 
at the 99% level are presented with three asterisks (***).   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 InnoAft InnoAft InnoAft InnoAft InnoAft InnoAft 
Panel A: first-stage coefficient      
ln(firmno) 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) Firm_age 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) State_Shr 0.135*** 0.135*** 0.135*** 0.135*** 0.151*** 0.151*** 
 (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.026) (0.026) Leverage -0.219*** -0.221*** -0.219*** -0.221*** -0.232*** -0.232*** 
 (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.023) (0.023) Firm_size 0.283*** 0.288*** 0.283*** 0.288*** 0.288*** 0.288*** 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) _cons -3.750*** -3.800*** -3.750*** -3.800*** -8.979 -8.980 
 (0.063) (0.063) (0.063) (0.063) (97.344) (97.344) Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Panel B: second-stage regression      
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 lnnewpro newproratio lnexport exportratio lnpatent lninvention 
InnoAft 5.875*** 0.736*** 7.889*** 0.380*** 0.820*** 0.342*** 
 (0.811) -0.064 (0.916) (0.063) (0.077) (0.057) Firm_age 0.018*** 0.0004 0.016*** -0.001*** 0.001** 0.0002 
 -0.003 (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) State_Shr 0.047 -0.008 -1.024*** -0.057*** -0.024*** -0.011* 
 (0.105) (0.008) (0.096) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) Leverage -0.267 0.005 0.203 0.029* 0.022* 0.026 
 (0.285) (0.010) (0.179) (0.016) (0.011) (0.020) Firm_size 0.227*** 0.0003 0.223*** 0.014*** -0.010*** -0.009*** 
 -0.021 (0.003) (0.022) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) _cons -1.041*** 0.018 -0.598*** -0.036** 0.140*** 0.083*** 
 (0.203) (0.023) (0.203) (0.018) (0.020) (0.013) Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
N 58,507 58,284 58,507 58,284 69,247 69,247 
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
              
 Table 7: Project Screening and Innofund Effects  
This table reports the fixed effects panel regressions on the project screening system changes and the Innofund influences on innovation outputs of the firms based on random 
sample as described in Table 3.  Project screening system was changed from centralized screening to decentralized screening in 2005 according to the Innofund policy. We 
hence use this policy change to capture the project screening change. Inno_2005Bef is a dummy variable that is equals to 1 if the firm has gained Innofund support at time t 
and the Innofund was granted before 2005 and equals zero otherwise. Inno_2005Aft is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the firm has gained Innofund support at time t 
and the first Innofund was granted after 2005 and equals zero otherwise. Innovation outputs are measured by the natural logarithm of new product sales of the firm 
(Lnnewpro), ratio of total new product sales over total sales of the firm (newproratio), natural logarithm of export volume of the firm (Lnexport), ratio of total export volume 
over total sales of the firm (exportratio), total number of newly granted patents of the firm (patent) and total number of newly granted invention patents of the firm (invention) 
in a given year. Firm size (Firm_size) is measured by the natural logarithm of the annual sales of the firm in a given year. Leverage is the ratio of total liability over the total 
assets of the firm in a given year.  State_Shr is the ratio of state ownership over the total equity of a firm in a given year. We also control firm age, and year and firm fixed 
effects. Model (1), (2), (3), (4), (7) and (8) are fixed effect panel data models while Model (5) and (6) are negative binomial models. Standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. Correlations significant at the 90% confidence level are presented with one asterisk (*), those significant at the 95% level are presented in bold with two 
asterisks (**), and those significant at the 99% level are presented with three asterisks (***).  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 lnnewpro newproratio lnexport exportratio patent invention lnpatent lninvention 
Inno_2005Bef 0.708*** 0.024*** 0.569*** 0.008* 0.971*** 1.561*** 0.134*** 0.089*** 
 (0.115) (0.007) (0.087) (0.005) (0.046) (0.063) (0.014) (0.009) Inno_2005Aft 0.886*** 0.045*** 0.555*** 0.016*** 1.277*** 1.802*** 0.177*** 0.118*** 
 (0.144) (0.009) (0.110) (0.005) (0.055) (0.073) (0.019) (0.013) Firm_age -0.019 -0.001 0.019* 0.001 -0.001 -0.003 -0.001 0.0004 
 (0.015) (0.001) (0.010) (0.001) (0.003) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) State_Shr 0.105 0.003 0.048 -0.003 0.104 0.125 -0.006 -0.005 
 (0.090) (0.005) (0.062) (0.003) (0.067) (0.104) (0.008) (0.005) Leverage -0.086 -0.011** 0.084 0.003 -0.319*** -0.630*** -0.006 -0.008*** 
 (0.062) (0.005) (0.061) (0.004) (0.067) (0.098) (0.005) (0.003) Firm_size 0.312*** 0.003** 0.420*** 0.010*** 0.352*** 0.395*** 0.020*** 0.008*** 
 (0.021) (0.002) (0.021) (0.001) (0.015) (0.021) (0.002) (0.001) _cons -1.449*** 0.048*** -2.261*** 0.011 -5.742*** -7.827*** -0.170*** -0.084*** 
 (0.225) (0.016) (0.222) (0.014) (0.267) (0.750) (0.024) (0.014) Year and Firm Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y N N Y Y 
N 70,247 69,937 70,247 69,937 81,584 81,584 81,584 81,584 
adj. R-sq 0.023 0.005 0.041 0.003   0.032 0.034 P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 Table 8: Regional Heterogeneity of Innofund Effects  
This table reports the fixed effects panel estimations on regional heterogeneity of Innofund effects on innovation outputs of the firms based on the random sample as 
described in Table 3. Panel A, Panel B and Panel C present the impacts of economic development, the development of the private sector and the quality of the institutions of 
the province on Innofund effects respectively. Economic development is measured by DVP, a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the province is defined as a developed 
region in a given year by the State Statistical Bureau, and equals 0 otherwise. Pri indicates the share of the total non-SOEs in a given province in a given year. Instn 
represents the quality of institutions in a given province in a given year which is measured by the development of local institutions, including patent protection departments, 
law firms, and accounting firms.  InnoAft is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the firm has gained Innofund support at time t, and equals zero otherwise. Innovation 
outputs are measured by the natural logarithm of new product sales of the firm (Lnnewpro), ratio of total new product sales over total sales of the firm (newproratio), natural 
logarithm of export volume of the firm (Lnexport), ratio of total export volume over total sales of the firm (exportratio), total number of newly granted patents of the firm 
(patent) and total number of newly granted invention patents of the firm (invention) in a given year. Firm size (Firm_size) is measured by the natural logarithm of the annual 
sales of the firm in a given year. Leverage is the ratio of total liability over the total assets of the firm in a given year.  State_Shr is the ratio of state ownership over the total 
equity of a firm in a given year. We also control firm age, and year and firm fixed effects. Model (1), (2), (3), (4), (7) and (8) are fixed effect panel data models while Model 
(5) and (6) are negative binomial models. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Correlations significant at the 90% confidence level are presented with one asterisk (*), 
those significant at the 95% level are presented in bold with two asterisks (**), and those significant at the 99% level are presented with three asterisks (***).   
         
Panel A.  Economic Development and Innofund Effects  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 lnnewpro newproratio lnexport exportratio patent invention lnpatent lninvention 
InnoAft 0.407*** 0.009 0.467*** 0.007* 1.054*** 1.544*** 0.099*** 0.075*** 
 (0.112) (0.007) (0.085) (0.004) (0.053) (0.073) (0.014) (0.009) 
DVP 8.278** 0.387** -0.753 -0.137 0.211*** 0.159** 0.174 0.091 
 (3.442) (0.165) (0.776) (0.138) (0.045) (0.067) (0.320) (0.294) InnoAft*DV
P 0.799*** 0.049*** 0.211 0.009 0.082 0.240** 0.112*** 0.054*** 
 (0.181) (0.012) (0.136) (0.007) (0.069) (0.099) (0.023) (0.015) 
Firm_age -0.020 -0.001 0.019* 0.001 -0.003 -0.005 -0.001 0.0003 
 (0.015) (0.001) (0.010) (0.001) (0.003) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) 
State_Shr 0.089 0.002 0.043 -0.003 0.146** 0.157 -0.008 -0.006 
 (0.090) (0.005) (0.062) (0.003) (0.068) (0.104) (0.008) (0.005) 
Leverage -0.087 -0.011** 0.084 0.004 -0.331*** -0.648*** -0.006 -0.008*** 
 (0.061) (0.005) (0.061) (0.004) (0.067) (0.098) (0.005) (0.003) 
Firm_size 0.313*** 0.003** 0.420*** 0.010*** 0.335*** 0.376*** 0.020*** 0.008*** 
 (0.021) (0.002) (0.021) (0.001) (0.015) (0.021) (0.002) (0.001) 
_cons -5.259*** -0.130* -1.908*** 0.075 -5.663*** -7.681*** -0.245 -0.123 
  (1.607) (0.078) (0.424) (0.065) (0.267) (0.749) (0.151) (0.137) Year and 
Firm Fixed 
Effects 
Y Y Y Y N N Y Y 
N 70,247 69,937 70,247 69,937 81,584 81,584 81,584 81,584 
adj. R-sq 0.025 0.006 0.041 0.003   0.033 0.035 
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Panel B. Private Sector Development and Innfound Effects  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 lnnewpro newproratio lnexport exportratio patent invention lnpatent lninvention 
InnoAft -0.149 -0.003 0.011 -0.005 0.908*** 1.370*** -0.033 -0.033 
 (0.211) (0.014) (0.164) (0.008) (0.095) (0.135) (0.028) (0.020) 
Pri 0.147*** 0.011*** 0.059*** 0.004*** 0.057*** 0.043*** 0.001 0.001 
 (0.023) (0.001) (0.021) (0.001) (0.010) (0.015) (0.003) (0.002) 
InnoAft*Pri 0.155*** 0.006*** 0.090*** 0.003** 0.034** 0.048** 0.030*** 0.022*** 
 (0.033) (0.002) (0.026) (0.001) (0.014) (0.019) (0.004) (0.003) 
Firm_age -0.020 -0.001 0.018* 0.001 -0.002 -0.004 -0.001 0.0001 
 (0.016) (0.001) (0.011) (0.001) (0.003) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) 
State_Shr 0.086 -0.001 0.071 -0.001 0.120* 0.092 -0.008 -0.007 
 (0.095) (0.005) (0.064) (0.003) (0.071) (0.108) (0.009) (0.005) 
Leverage -0.085 -0.011** 0.081 0.003 -0.351*** -0.650*** -0.008 -0.009*** 
 (0.065) (0.006) (0.062) (0.004) (0.068) (0.099) (0.005) (0.003) 
Firm_size 0.299*** 0.002 0.412*** 0.009*** 0.336*** 0.378*** 0.020*** 0.008*** 
 (0.022) (0.002) (0.023) (0.001) (0.015) (0.021) (0.002) (0.001) 
_cons -1.887*** 0.017 -2.453*** -0.005 -5.821*** -7.194*** -0.147*** -0.074*** 
 (0.252) (0.018) (0.250) (0.016) (0.180) (0.292) (0.025) (0.015) Year and 
Firm Fixed 
Effects 
Y Y Y Y N N Y Y 
N 65,471 65,192 65,471 65,192 75,677 75,677 75,677 75,677 
adj. R-sq 0.026 0.008 0.040 0.004   0.031 0.035 
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
          
Panel C. Institutions and Innofund Effects 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 lnnewpro newproratio lnexport exportratio patent invention lnpatent lninvention 
InnoAft 0.108 0.011 0.197 -0.0002 0.969*** 1.454*** 0.0004 -0.009 
 (0.178) (0.011) (0.141) (0.007) (0.079) (0.113) (0.022) (0.015) 
Instn 0.111*** 0.005*** 0.040*** 0.003*** 0.043*** 0.032*** 0.002 -0.001 
 (0.016) (0.001) (0.014) (0.001) (0.008) (0.011) (0.002) (0.001) InnoAft*Inst
n 0.097*** 0.003** 0.051*** 0.002* 0.022** 0.030** 0.021*** 0.016*** 
 (0.023) (0.002) (0.018) (0.001) (0.009) (0.014) (0.003) (0.002) 
Firm_age -0.020 -0.001 0.018* 0.001 -0.002 -0.004 -0.001 0.0001 
 (0.016) (0.001) (0.011) (0.001) (0.003) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) 
State_Shr 0.049 -0.002 0.060 -0.002 0.114 0.096 -0.009 -0.007 
 (0.095) (0.005) (0.064) (0.003) (0.071) (0.108) (0.009) (0.005) 
Leverage -0.076 -0.010* 0.085 0.003 -0.356*** -0.657*** -0.008 -0.009*** 
 (0.065) (0.006) (0.063) (0.004) (0.068) (0.099) (0.005) (0.003) 
Firm_size 0.298*** 0.002 0.411*** 0.009*** 0.333*** 0.377*** 0.020*** 0.008*** 
 (0.022) (0.002) (0.023) (0.001) (0.015) (0.021) (0.002) (0.001) _cons -1.709*** 0.041** -2.369*** -0.001 -5.720*** -7.120*** -0.150*** -0.068*** 
 (0.242) (0.017) (0.240) (0.015) (0.178) (0.290) (0.023) (0.013) Year and 
Firm Fixed 
Effects 
Y Y Y Y N N Y Y 
N 65,471 65,192 65,471 65,192 75,677 75,677 75,677 75,677 
adj. R-sq 0.027 0.007 0.040 0.004   0.031 0.036 
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 Table 9: Regional Heterogeneity, Project Screening and Innofund Effects 
This table reports the fixed effects panel estimations on the influences of regional heterogeneity and project screening on Innofund effects based on the random sample as 
described in Table 3. Panel A presents how economic development of a region and the project screening changes affect the innovation outputs of the Innofund-backed firms. 
Panel B reports how private sector development and the project screening influence the innovation outputs of the Innofund-backed firms. Panel C shows how institutions and 
the project screening impact on the Innofund effects. Project screening system was changed from centralized screening to decentralized screening in 2005 according to the 
Innofund policy. We hence use this policy change to capture the project screening change. Inno_2005Bef is a dummy variable that is equals to 1 if the firm has gained 
Innofund support at time t and the Innofund was granted before 2005 and equals zero otherwise. Inno_2005Aft is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the firm has gained 
Innofund support at time t and the first Innofund was granted after 2005 and equals zero otherwise. Economic development is measured by DVP, a dummy variable that is 
equal to 1 if the province is defined as a developed region in a given year by the State Statistical Bureau, and equals 0 otherwise. Pri indicates the share of the total non-SOEs 
in a given province in a given year. Instn represents the quality of institutions in a given province in a given year which is measured by the development of local institutions, 
including patent protection departments, law firms, and accounting firms.  InnoAft is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the firm has gained Innofund support at time t, 
and equals zero otherwise. Innovation outputs are measured by the natural logarithm of new product sales of the firm (Lnnewpro), ratio of total new product sales over total 
sales of the firm (newproratio), natural logarithm of export volume of the firm (Lnexport), ratio of total export volume over total sales of the firm (exportratio), total number 
of newly granted patents of the firm (patent) and total number of newly granted invention patents of the firm (invention) in a given year. Firm size (Firm_size) is measured 
by the natural logarithm of the annual sales of the firm in a given year. Leverage is the ratio of total liability over the total assets of the firm in a given year.  State_Shr is the 
ratio of state ownership over the total equity of a firm in a given year. We also control firm age, and year and firm fixed effects. Model (1), (2), (3), (4), (7) and (8) are fixed 
effect panel data models while Model (5) and (6) are negative binomial models. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Correlations significant at the 90% confidence 
level are presented with one asterisk (*), those significant at the 95% level are presented in bold with two asterisks (**), and those significant at the 99% level are presented 
with three asterisks (***).    
Panel A. Economic Development, Screening System Change and Innofund Effects  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 lnnewpro newproratio lnexport exportratio patent invention lnpatent lninvention 
Inno_2005Bef 0.419*** 0.0004 0.495*** 0.009 0.907*** 1.423*** 0.080*** 0.066*** 
 (0.149) (0.009) (0.114) (0.006) (0.063) (0.087) (0.017) (0.011) 
Inno_2005Aft 0.389** 0.021** 0.426*** 0.005 1.286*** 1.717*** 0.125*** 0.087*** 
 (0.168) (0.010) (0.127) (0.005) (0.074) (0.097) (0.023) (0.016) 
DVP 8.274** 0.386** -0.753 -0.138 0.205*** 0.155** 0.173 0.090 
 (3.444) (0.165) (0.776) (0.138) (0.045) (0.067) (0.321) (0.294) 
Inno_2005B*DVP 0.592*** 0.047*** 0.152 -0.001 0.143* 0.282** 0.110*** 0.045*** 
 (0.229) (0.015) (0.170) (0.009) (0.083) (0.118) (0.028) (0.017) 
Inno_2005A*DVP 1.243*** 0.060*** 0.321 0.029*** 0.006 0.191 0.127*** 0.076*** 
 (0.299) (0.019) (0.231) (0.011) (0.099) (0.134) (0.039) (0.027) 
Firm_age -0.021 -0.001 0.019* 0.001 -0.001 -0.004 -0.001 0.0002 
 (0.015) (0.001) (0.010) (0.001) (0.003) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) 
State_Shr 0.091 0.002 0.043 -0.003 0.149** 0.167 -0.008 -0.006 
 (0.090) (0.005) (0.061) (0.003) (0.068) (0.104) (0.008) (0.005) 
 Leverage  -0.087 -0.011** 0.084 0.004 -0.334*** -0.653*** -0.006 -0.008*** 
 (0.061) (0.005) (0.061) (0.004) (0.067) (0.098) (0.005) (0.003) 
Firm_size 0.313*** 0.003** 0.420*** 0.010*** 0.344*** 0.385*** 0.020*** 0.008*** 
 (0.021) (0.002) (0.021) (0.001) (0.015) (0.021) (0.002) (0.001) 
_cons -5.256*** -0.130* -1.907*** 0.075 -5.779*** -7.814*** -0.246 -0.124 
 (1.608) (0.078) (0.424) (0.065) (0.268) (0.750) (0.151) (0.137) 
Year and Firm Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y N N Y Y 
N 70,247 69,937 70,247 69,937 81,584 81,584 81,584 81,584 
adj. R-sq 0.025 0.007 0.041 0.004   0.033 0.035 
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Panel B. Private Sector Development , Screening System Change and Innofund Effects 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 lnnewpro newproratio lnexport exportratio patent invention lnpatent lninvention 
Inno_2005B -0.134 -0.001 -0.091 -0.00663 0.764*** 1.275*** -0.061* -0.053** 
 (0.260) (0.017) (0.206) (0.00985) (0.107) (0.153) (0.033) (0.024) 
Inno_2005A -0.196 -0.013 0.298 -0.00312 1.323*** 1.594*** 0.024 0.012 
 (0.346) (0.023) (0.244) (0.0106) (0.156) (0.205) (0.053) (0.037) 
Pri 0.147*** 0.011*** 0.058*** 0.00369*** 0.060*** 0.045*** 0.001 0.001 
 (0.023) (0.001) (0.021) (0.00141) (0.010) (0.015) (0.003) (0.002) 
Inno_2005B*Pri 0.150*** 0.005* 0.114*** 0.00245 0.041*** 0.050** 0.032*** 0.024*** 
 (0.042) (0.003) (0.033) (0.00166) (0.016) (0.022) (0.005) (0.004) 
Inno_2005A*Pri 0.165*** 0.009** 0.040 0.00288* -0.001 0.032 0.023*** 0.016*** 
 (0.053) (0.004) (0.037) (0.00174) (0.021) (0.027) (0.008) (0.006) 
Firm_age -0.020 -0.001 0.018* 0.000842 -0.001 -0.003 -0.001 0.0002 
 (0.016) (0.001) (0.011) (0.000697) (0.003) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) 
State_Shr 0.086 -0.001 0.071 -0.000767 0.126* 0.101 -0.008 -0.007 
 (0.095) (0.005) (0.064) (0.00313) (0.071) (0.107) (0.009) (0.005) 
Leverage -0.085 -0.011** 0.081 0.00283 -0.352*** -0.653*** -0.008 -0.009*** 
 (0.065) (0.006) (0.062) (0.00383) (0.068) (0.099) (0.005) (0.003) 
Firm_size 0.299*** 0.002 0.412*** 0.00916*** 0.343*** 0.386*** 0.020*** 0.008*** 
 (0.022) (0.002) (0.023) (0.00141) (0.015) (0.021) (0.002) (0.001) 
_cons -1.888*** 0.017 -2.448*** -0.00482 -5.911*** -7.283*** -0.147*** -0.073*** 
 (0.252) (0.018) (0.250) (0.0159) (0.181) (0.295) (0.025) (0.015) 
Year and Firm Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y N N Y Y 
 N 65,471 65,192 65,471 65,192 75,677 75,677 75,677 75,677 
adj. R-sq 0.026 0.008 0.040 0.004   0.031 0.036 
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Panel C. Institutions, Screening System Change and Innofund Effects 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 lnnewpro newproratio lnexport exportratio patent invention lnpatent lninvention 
Inno_2005B 0.166 0.015 0.170 -0.001 0.813*** 1.318*** -0.024 -0.026 
 (0.213) (0.013) (0.172) (0.008) (0.088) (0.127) (0.026) (0.018) 
Inno_2005A -0.094 -0.007 0.319 -0.0003 1.433*** 1.775*** 0.062 0.036 
 (0.307) (0.020) (0.218) (0.010) (0.135) (0.176) (0.043) (0.029) 
Instn 0.111*** 0.005*** 0.040*** 0.003*** 0.047*** 0.034*** 0.002 -0.001 
 (0.016) (0.001) (0.014) (0.001) (0.008) (0.011) (0.002) (0.001) 
Inno_2005B*Instn 0.086*** 0.002 0.060*** 0.001 0.030*** 0.038** 0.023*** 0.017*** 
 (0.029) (0.002) (0.023) (0.001) (0.011) (0.015) (0.004) (0.003) 
Inno_2005A*Instn 0.125*** 0.007*** 0.031 0.002 -0.012 0.008 0.015*** 0.011*** 
 (0.038) (0.003) (0.027) (0.001) (0.014) (0.019) (0.005) (0.004) 
Firm_age -0.020 -0.001 0.018* 0.001 -0.001 -0.003 -0.001 0.0002 
 (0.016) (0.001) (0.011) (0.001) (0.003) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) 
State_Shr 0.048 -0.002 0.060 -0.002 0.119* 0.105 -0.008 -0.007 
 (0.095) (0.005) (0.064) (0.003) (0.071) (0.108) (0.009) (0.005) 
Leverage -0.076 -0.010* 0.085 0.003 -0.357*** -0.659*** -0.008 -0.009*** 
 (0.065) (0.006) (0.063) (0.004) (0.068) (0.099) (0.005) (0.003) 
Firm_size 0.298*** 0.002 0.411*** 0.009*** 0.341*** 0.385*** 0.020*** 0.008*** 
 (0.022) (0.002) (0.023) (0.001) (0.015) (0.021) (0.002) (0.001) 
_cons -1.709*** 0.041** -2.368*** -0.001 -5.815*** -7.211*** -0.150*** -0.068*** 
 (0.242) (0.017) (0.240) (0.015) (0.179) (0.292) (0.023) (0.013) 
Year and Firm Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y N N Y Y 
N 65,471 65,192 65,471 65,192 75,677 75,677 75,677 75,677 
adj. R-sq 0.027 0.007 0.040 0.004   0.031 0.036 
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
 Appendix 
Table A.1 Summary Statistics of the PSM Sample 
This table reports the summary statistics and T-tests of the Innofund-backed firms and their counterparts selected by propensity score matching.  
   (1) (2) (2) - (1) (3) (3) - (1) 
Variable   Innofund-backed  firms 
non-Innofund-backed 
firms in random draw 
sample 
Difference and 
t-statistics 
non-Innofund-backed 
firms in PSM sample 
Difference and 
t-statistics 
ln(new product sales) Mean 3.338 0.915 -2.423*** 3.381 0.043 
 Observations 2,293 10,461 (-24.102) 9,436 (0.399) 
ln(export) Mean 2.499 1.802 -0.697*** 2.520 0.021 
 Observations 2,293 10,461 (-7.472) 9,436 (0.217) 
Patent (number) Mean 0.796 0.085 -0.711*** 0.696 -0.100 
 Observations 2,638 12,025 (-10.657) 10,739 (-0.899) 
Invention (number)  Mean 0.312 0.021 -0.291*** 0.216 -0.096 
 Observations 2,638 12,025 (-8.100) 10,739 (-1.053) 
ln(employee) Mean 4.970 4.424 -0.546*** 4.952 -0.018 
  Observations 2,638 12,025 (-25.187) 10,739 (-0.834) 
 
 Table A.2 2SLS Regressions in PSM Sample 
This table reports the 2SLS regressions for Innofund effects based on samples selected by propensity score 
matching. Panel A shows the first stage of the estimations and Panel B presents the second stage estimations. 
Ln(firmno) is the instrumental variable to predict whether a specific firm might be supported by Innofund in a 
given year. It is the total number of firms in high-tech zones in a given city in a given year. The dependent 
variable in Panel A is InnoAft which is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the firm has gained Innofund 
support at time t, and equals zero otherwise. The dependent variables in Panel B are measurements for 
innovation outputs which are measured by the natural logarithm of new product sales of the firm (Lnnewpro), 
ratio of total new product sales over total sales of the firm (newproratio), natural logarithm of export volume of 
the firm (Lnexport), ratio of total export volume over total sales of the firm (exportratio), total number of newly 
granted patents of the firm (patent) and total number of newly granted invention patents of the firm (invention) 
in a given year. Firm size (Firm_size) is measured by the natural logarithm of the annual sales of the firm in a 
given year. Leverage is the ratio of total liability over the total assets of the firm in a given year.  State_Shr is 
the ratio of state ownership over the total equity of a firm in a given year. We also control firm age, and year and 
firm fixed effects. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Correlations significant at the 90% confidence 
level are presented with one asterisk (*), those significant at the 95% level are presented in bold with two 
asterisks (**), and those significant at the 99% level are presented with three asterisks (***).   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 InnoAft InnoAft InnoAft InnoAft  InnoAft InnoAft 
Panel A: first-stage coefficient      
ln(firmno) 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Firm_age -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 0.0001 0.0002 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) State_Shr 0.074*** 0.073*** 0.074*** 0.073*** 0.086*** 0.086*** 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.025) (0.025) Leverage -0.237*** -0.238*** -0.237*** -0.238*** -0.250*** -0.250*** 
 (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.023) (0.023) 
Firm_size 0.129*** 0.132*** 0.129*** 0.132*** 0.135*** 0.135*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
_cons -2.041*** -2.072*** -2.041*** -2.072*** -7.080 -7.081 
 (0.061) (0.061) (0.061) (0.061) (67.178) (67.178) 
Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Panel B: second-stage regression      
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 lnnewpro newproratio lnexport exportratio lnpatent lninvention 
InnoAft 4.139** 1.052*** 4.237* 0.050 3.422*** 1.552*** 
 (2.169) (0.157) (2.192) (0.080) (0.491) (0.168) Firm_age 0.048*** 0.003*** 0.005 -0.003*** 0.010*** 0.005*** 
 (0.007) (0.001) (0.007) (0.0004) (0.001) (0.001) 
State_Shr 0.622*** -0.009 -0.399* -0.025*** -0.164*** -0.088*** 
 (0.229) (0.016) (0.221) (0.008) (0.048) (0.018) 
Leverage -0.561 0.014 -0.325 -0.012 0.040 0.064* 
 (0.771) (0.039) (0.744) (0.017) (0.167) (0.035) Firm_size 0.625*** 0.010 0.488*** 0.029*** -0.068*** -0.050*** 
 (0.050) (0.005) (0.060) (0.003) (0.011) (0.005) 
_cons -4.082*** -0.081* -2.258*** -0.130*** 0.766*** 0.482*** 
 (0.501) (0.043) (0.576) (0.024) (0.122) (0.060) 
Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
N 58,979 58,863 58,979 58,863 69,787 69,787 
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
               
 Table A.3 Innofund and Innovation Outputs for the Subsamples Before and After 2005 
This table presents the fixed effects panel regressions of Innofund on innovation outputs for the subsamples gaining Innofund before and after 2005 to further address the 
effects of the policy change in project screening on Innofund influence. Panel A only includes the firms backed by Innofund before 2005 and their non-Innofund-backed 
counterparts and Panel B shows the estimations for subsample that only includes the firms backed by Innofund after 2005 and their non-Innofund-backed counterparts. 
InnoAft is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the firm has gained Innofund support at time t, and equals zero otherwise. Innovation outputs are measured by the natural 
logarithm of new product sales of the firm (Lnnewpro), ratio of total new product sales over total sales of the firm (newproratio), natural logarithm of export volume of the 
firm (Lnexport), ratio of total export volume over total sales of the firm (exportratio), total number of newly granted patents of the firm (patent) and total number of newly 
granted invention patents of the firm (invention) in a given year. Firm size (Firm_size) is measured by the natural logarithm of the annual sales of the firm in a given year. 
Leverage is the ratio of total liability over the total assets of the firm in a given year.  State_Shr is the ratio of state ownership over the total equity of a firm in a given year. 
We also control firm age, and year and firm fixed effects. Model (1), (2), (3), (4), (7) and (8) are fixed effect panel data models while Model (5) and (6) are negative binomial 
models. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Correlations significant at the 90% confidence level are presented with one asterisk (*), those significant at the 95% level 
are presented in bold with two asterisks (**), and those significant at the 99% level are presented with three asterisks (***). 
Panel A: Innofund and Innovation Outputs for Firms Backed Before 2005  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 lnnewpro newproratio lnexport exportratio patent invention lnpatent lninvention 
InnoAft 0.690*** 0.024*** 0.560*** 0.008* 1.114*** 1.636*** 0.137*** 0.088*** 
 (0.115) (0.007) (0.088) (0.005) (0.051) (0.071) (0.014) (0.008) 
Firm_age -0.033** -0.002* 0.020 0.0004 -0.004 -0.010** -0.001 0.0004 
 (0.016) (0.001) (0.013) (0.001) (0.003) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) 
State_Shr 0.133 0.001 0.044 -0.004 0.198** 0.256** 0.001 -0.006 
 (0.107) (0.006) (0.072) (0.004) (0.078) (0.119) (0.010) (0.006) 
Leverage -0.002 -0.003 0.036 0.001 -0.400*** -0.645*** -0.005 -0.006* 
 (0.072) (0.004) (0.084) (0.005) (0.086) (0.128) (0.006) (0.003) 
Firm_size 0.308*** 0.004** 0.429*** 0.010*** 0.377*** 0.405*** 0.020*** 0.009*** 
 (0.025) (0.002) (0.027) (0.002) (0.019) (0.027) (0.002) (0.001) 
_cons -1.186*** 0.051*** -2.177*** 0.015 -5.962*** -7.669*** -0.165*** -0.084*** 
 (0.273) (0.020) (0.283) (0.018) (0.312) (0.776) (0.029) (0.016) 
Year and Firm Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y N N Y Y 
N 44,479 44,200 44,479 44,200 51,080 51,080 51,080 51,080 
adj. R-sq 0.023 0.003 0.041 0.003   0.029 0.031 
 P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Panel B: Innofund and Innovation Outputs for Firms Backed After 2005  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 lnnewpro newproratio lnexport exportratio patent invention lnpatent lninvention 
InnoAft 1.002*** 0.048*** 0.614*** 0.016*** 1.260*** 1.888*** 0.184*** 0.127*** 
 (0.143) (0.009) (0.109) (0.005) (0.068) (0.092) (0.019) (0.013) 
Firm_age 0.023 0.001 0.018* 0.001* 0.008* 0.007 -0.002 0.001 
 (0.033) (0.002) (0.011) (0.001) (0.004) (0.006) (0.002) (0.001) 
State_Shr 0.027 0.008 0.067 -0.001 -0.083 -0.183 -0.021 -0.003 
 (0.169) (0.010) (0.119) (0.005) (0.132) (0.218) (0.015) (0.007) 
Leverage -0.234** -0.024** 0.179*** 0.008* -0.187* -0.618*** -0.008 -0.011** 
 (0.102) (0.010) (0.068) (0.005) (0.105) (0.154) (0.010) (0.005) 
Firm_size 0.330*** 0.002 0.400*** 0.009*** 0.327*** 0.386*** 0.020*** 0.008*** 
 (0.039) (0.003) (0.035) (0.002) (0.025) (0.035) (0.004) (0.002) 
_cons -1.950*** 0.044 -2.357*** 0.005 -5.734*** -26.510 -0.196*** -0.092*** 
 (0.397) (0.028) (0.351) (0.020) (0.578) (17798.0) (0.047) (0.026) 
Year and Firm Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y N N Y Y 
N 25,768 25,737 25,768 25,737 30,504 30,504 30,504 30,504 
adj. R-sq 0.026 0.009 0.039 0.005   0.036 0.040 
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
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